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We generalize the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model by disentangling payo↵ delay from
bargaining delay. We show that our extension is isomorphic to generalized discounting with
dynamic consistency and characterize the unique equilibrium. Using a novel experimental design
to control for various confounds, we then test comparative statics predictions with respect to time
discounting. All bargaining takes place within a single experimental session, so bargaining delay
is negligible and dynamic consistency holds by design, while payo↵ delay per disagreement round
is significant and randomized transparently at the individual level (week/month, with/without
front-end delay). In contrast to prior experiments, we obtain strong behavioral support for the
basic predictions that hold regardless of the details of discounting. Testing di↵erential predictions
of di↵erent forms of discounting, we strongly reject exponential discounting in favor of present-
biased discounting.
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1 Introduction
How will two parties to a transaction divide the economic surplus that it creates? As fundamental
as this question is to economics, it was not until the work of Rubinstein (1982) that economic the-
ory o↵ered a useful answer in terms of a tractable strategic model with a clear prediction based on
the parties’ individual preferences. His disciplined model of the bargaining process as one of indefi-
nitely alternating o↵ers constitutes the core of modern non-cooperative bargaining theory; it has been
extended in many directions and applied to various settings.1
The central driving force of this theory is the parties’ individual costs of the payo↵ delay that
results whenever they disagree. Their time preferences determine their relative bargaining power. Not
surprisingly, given the model’s importance, several studies have experimentally tested its predictions.
However, the costs of disagreement in all of these studies have been implemented either as a reduction
in monetary surplus or as a risk of exogenous breakdown rather than as a payo↵ delay. Hence, whether
actual time preferences behaviorally a↵ect the bargaining outcome as predicted has remained an open
question.
In this paper, we introduce a novel experimental design that directly addresses this question. In
contrast to the prior experimental literature, we find strong behavioral support for all fundamental
predictions of the theory once we account for present bias. Quite remarkably, this is in line with the
large body of empirical studies that directly measure time preferences and document present bias as
the most important qualitative deviation from exponential discounting (e.g., Frederick, Loewenstein,
and O’Donoghue, 2002; Augenblick, Niederle, and Sprenger, 2015; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2015).
Our key innovation, both theoretically and experimentally, is to disentangle the timing of payo↵s
from the timing of bargaining rounds. Theoretically, we generalize the classic Rubinstein (1982) model
to arbitrary payo↵ delays per round of disagreement and general time preferences, with the only
substantial assumption that preferences are dynamically consistent. We establish and characterize the
unique (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium of this game, which involves history-independent strategies
and has immediate agreement in every round. When the delay between any two rounds of bargaining
is negligible—i.e., o↵ers are frequent, so that bargaining is essentially instantaneous—preferences are
dynamically consistent in this game by design. Our theory therefore also covers any “naturally”
dynamically inconsistent time preferences, such as quasi-hyperbolic and hyperbolic discounting, but
without confronting any issues of intra-personal conflict or näıveté that arise when, instead, decisions
are made over a significant time horizon.
The game we experimentally implement exploits this theoretical observation: All bargaining takes
place within a single session, with frequent o↵ers, whereas actual payo↵s are subject to significant
1The books by Osborne and Rubinstein (1990a) and Muthoo (1999) provide overviews. Relatedly, Binmore, Rubin-
stein, and Wolinsky (1986) show how the model provides a non-cooperative foundation to the Nash bargaining solution
(Nash, 1950), which has been a major modeling device used in applied theory and empirical work (for a recent example,
see Ho and Lee, 2017).
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delay per round of disagreement.2 Thus, we avoid the major concern with actual longitudinal designs
(e.g., Sprenger, 2015) that attrition may be systematically related to time preferences.3
While the theory parsimoniously focuses on time preferences and assumes these are common knowl-
edge, people’s preferences also include other relevant concerns—in particular, fairness and risk—and
are highly heterogeneous. Strategic interaction is therefore inherently subject to incomplete infor-
mation (relatedly, see Fanning and Kloosterman, 2019). We employ a novel experimental approach,
recently introduced by Kim (2019b) as the e↵ective discounting procedure,4 to control for various pref-
erence “confounds” and establish a setting in which time preferences nonetheless translate into clear
comparative statics predictions to be tested between subjects. The procedure randomly assigns partic-
ipants their individual length of payo↵ delay—either a week or a month per round of disagreement, and
either including a front-end delay or not—and thereby creates groups of bargainers that are similar in
terms of their underlying general preferences but di↵er in their e↵ective time preferences. The payo↵
delay profiles that bargainers individually face, their “types,” are made common knowledge within any
bargaining match.
Our experimental treatments correspond to particular matchings of such bargainer types. We
implement three of these: Treatment WM matches bargainers whose payo↵ gets delayed by one
week per round of disagreement (“weekly bargainers”) with bargainers for whom this is one month
(“monthly bargainers”); Treatment WM2D is similar, except that every bargainer’s payo↵ comes with
an additional front-end delay of one week (even in case of immediate agreement, and we call these
bargainers “delayed”); Treatment WW1D matches two weekly bargainers of whom exactly one faces
such a front-end delay. Within each treatment, participants play ten games under random rematching
(subject to the treatment condition), with their individual type fixed throughout. In every such game,
which type gets to make the initial proposal is determined randomly, so we observe both versions of
the alternating-o↵ers game for any type match in a treatment.
Under symmetry in terms of underlying preferences, assumptions on time preferences translate our
type manipulation into di↵erences in bargaining power. These comparative statics predictions in time
preferences are our main focus, and we test them by comparing the cumulative distribution functions
of behavioral measures of interest for first-order stochastic dominance. Although conservative, we
deem this approach appropriate because our manipulation is supposed to e↵ectively “shift” the entire
distribution of time preferences.
The natural benchmark is constant/exponential discounting (EXD), for which our model reduces
2Our study is thereby tightly linked to the experimental evidence on time preferences elicited from binary choices
between various time-dated monetary rewards. Given the indefinite strategic interaction, to ensure the credibility of our
experiment, we additionally impose a commonly known 25% chance of random exogenous termination. This probability
is held constant across all rounds of all games in all treatments. Strictly speaking, time preferences should be interpreted
as including this risk here.
3Kim (2019a) indeed finds that patience and present bias measured at the beginning of his experiment closely
predicted how long participants would take part in his longitudinal study.
4We thank John Du↵y for helping coin this term.
3
exactly to that of Rubinstein (1982). Under EXD, the first two treatments are equivalent, and the
third treatment is symmetric because a front-end delay is strategically irrelevant, akin to a sunk cost.
In addition to the general predictions of immediate agreement and a proposer advantage, EXD clearly
implies that weekly bargainers obtain a greater share than monthly bargainers in the same initial role.5
Our data from Treatments WM and WM2D strongly confirm this basic delay advantage.6 However,
in contradiction to EXD, we find that the two treatments are not equivalent behaviorally, and that
the behavior in Treatment WW1D violates symmetry.
The leading alternative to EXD is quasi-hyperbolic discounting (QHD), which adds a single pa-
rameter to capture the empirically well-documented phenomenon of a present bias (Phelps and Pollak,
1968; Laibson, 1997). This model’s key implication is that a front-end delay is strategically advan-
tageous to initial respondents.7 Relative to EXD, QHD therefore clearly breaks the symmetry in
Treatment WW1D in favor of the delayed (weekly) bargainers. Our data from this treatment indeed
strongly confirm this front-end delay advantage. Similarly, QHD also breaks the equivalence between
Treatments WM and WM2D under EXD, in the direction of an advantage of respondents under the
latter treatment, where they are delayed. While we find some support for this prediction when we
compare those games where the initial proposer is a weekly bargainer, the opposite is true when we
compare those games where the initial proposer is a monthly bargainer.
This latter finding, in turn, is consistent with hyperbolic discounting, which also features a present
bias but as an instance of uniformly diminishing impatience. QHD can be interpreted as a parsimonious
approximation that focuses solely on present bias (see Frederick et al., 2002). Adding a front-end delay
shifts all delays into the future, and under hyperbolic discounting, this not only “removes” any present
bias but e↵ectively increases patience uniformly. In relative terms, this may increase bargaining power
more for a monthly bargainer than a weekly bargainer. Indeed, a pronounced present bias together with
hyperbolic discounting of future delays yields exactly those clear predictions from QHD that our data
strongly confirm, while at the same time rationalizing the behavioral findings that contradict QHD’s
predictions.8 Considering that hyperbolic discounting and present bias are exactly the key qualitative
properties of empirically measured time preferences, across a huge number of studies eliciting time
preferences from individual decisions, we interpret our findings as strong confirmation of the theory.
Overall, we conclude that time preferences are certainly not all that matters in bargaining, but
5We find a very high degree of e ciency in our experimental bargaining games, as almost three quarters end in
immediate agreement, without significant di↵erences across treatments. We also confirm a proposer advantage.
6We also strongly confirm this prediction in a comparison of behavior across TreatmentsWM andWW1D, which have
the weekly bargainers (with no delay) as a common type. The other comparison across treatments for this prediction,
namely WM2D and WW1D, which have the delayed weekly bargainers as a common type, violates it, but see below for
present bias and hyperbolic discounting.
7Note that from Round 2 onwards all agreements have delayed payo↵s, so present bias ceases to matter, and the
initial proposer’s strategic advantage means that only the respondent’s bias materializes in terms of equilibrium.
8To obtain clear predictions, we impose minimal structure on hyperbolic discounting satisfied by all commonly
considered models of such discounting; see Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) for a general parametric family. Closely
related are Halevy (2008) and Chakraborty, Halevy, and Saito (2020), who relate present bias and hyperbolic discounting
to the inherent uncertainty about future consumption and common violations of expected utility.
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they do matter significantly and in a manner that is theoretically predicted by and consistent with
what we know from the large body of work that has researched them.
Especially with respect to the negative conclusions from prior experimental investigations of the
Rubinstein (1982) model (to be discussed in the next section), our findings may therefore be regarded
as an unprecedented behavioral success story for the basic model of non-cooperative bargaining theory
when extended to incorporate the key properties of real time preferences. With the latter qualification,
they lend encouraging behavioral support to the large and important literature applying this model.
Moreover, our finding that people seem to commonly understand and strategically respond to present
bias not only supports the presumed prevalence of this bias but also promotes (further) theoretical work
on dynamic strategic interaction with present-biased individuals. Finally, viewed from a somewhat
di↵erent perspective, our results may also be taken as a demonstration of the methodological value
of the e↵ective discounting procedure for further experimental work on the role of time preferences in
strategic settings.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the most closely related
literature. We then present the general theoretical background for our study in Section 3. This is
followed by our experimental design, the behavioral predictions for the most important classes of time
preferences, and administrative details in Section 4. We report and discuss our experimental findings
in the subsequent Section 5. Finally, Section 6 o↵ers a brief conclusion. All proofs are relegated to
Appendix A. Appendices B and C provide additional figures and results on learning, and Appendices
D and E contain experimental instructions (for one exemplary experimental treatment) and selected
screenshots. Appendix F presents details of an additional time preference elicitation and results on
how these measures relate to bargaining behavior, which support the basic approach of our study.
2 Literature Review
Our review of the literature focuses on (1) theoretical analyses of time preferences in the canonical
bargaining environment with an infinite horizon and alternating o↵ers and (2) experimental studies
that investigate this bargaining model. There are large areas of work on bargaining that we do not
cover, including the vast experimental literature on ultimatum bargaining and finite-horizon sequential
bargaining, and the theoretical literature that extends the original Rubinstein (1982) model in several
other directions, such as multilateral bargaining, bargaining with asymmetric/incomplete information,
and endogenous proposer determination. For a recent review of the ultimatum bargaining literature,
see Güth and Kocher (2014). For a comprehensive survey of non-cooperative bargaining theory during
its most active period of research, see Binmore, Osborne, and Rubinstein (1992); for a more recent
survey focusing on incomplete information, see Ausubel, Cramton, and Deneckere (2002).
Theory. In his seminal paper, Rubinstein (1982) introduces the canonical bargaining model in which
two players alternate in making o↵ers to each other on how to divide a given surplus until they reach
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agreement. Assuming exponentially discounted concave utility and perfect information, there is a
unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. This equilibrium occurs in stationary strategies that imply
immediate agreement in any round, hence e ciency. Given impatience and that the burden of delay
is with the player responding to an o↵er, a proposing player enjoys a strategic advantage. Moreover,
ceteris paribus, the more patient a player is—in particular, the higher her discount factor for given
utility—the greater her bargaining power in the sense of capturing a larger share of the surplus in the
equilibrium agreement. With symmetric preferences, as o↵ers become infinitely frequent and players
approach perfect patience, the proposer advantage vanishes, and the equilibrium outcome converges
to an immediate equal split, as prescribed by the Nash (1950) bargaining solution.
Motivated by empirical evidence, several theoretical attempts have recently been made to gen-
eralize this model in terms of time preferences. Almost all have focused on “stable” preferences to
maintain the game’s stationarity property, which makes the game tractable. In this case, any devia-
tion from exponential discounting implies dynamic inconsistency, and Schweighofer-Kodritsch (2018)
provides a comprehensive equilibrium characterization under minimal preference assumptions when
these preferences are common knowledge, implying “full sophistication” (for related work see also Ok
and Masatlioglu, 2007; Noor, 2011; Pan, Webb, and Zank, 2015; Lu, 2016). He finds that with concave
utility, a weak present bias is su cient for a unique equilibrium similar to exponential discounting.
However, as Akin (2007) and Haan and Hauck (2019) show for quasi-hyperbolic discounting, näıveté
about present bias may lead to even perpetual disagreement.
We provide a hitherto overlooked alternative but formally equivalent interpretation to Rubin-
stein’s model as one where bargaining itself is essentially instantaneous, but payo↵s nonetheless are
significantly delayed with any disagreement. Based on this interpretation, we generalize the model
to arbitrary delays upon disagreement and general time preferences, under the sole substantial as-
sumption of dynamic consistency. This is a special case of bargaining over a time-varying surplus
as considered and geometrically analyzed by Binmore (1987), where the variation in surplus derives
from non-constant discounting (see also Coles and Muthoo, 2003). Relative to this prior work, our
theoretical contribution consists in showing that, under very mild assumptions on time preferences,
there is a unique equilibrium and providing an algebraic proof.
Experiments. Weg, Rapoport, and Felsenthal (1990) and Rapoport, Weg, and Felsenthal (1990)
are the first experimental studies of an infinite-horizon, alternating-o↵ers bargaining game. Both
implement a within-subjects shrinking-pie design. They compare two conditions, equal and unequal
“discount factors,” which correspond to the rates at which the players’ value of the pie shrinks over
bargaining rounds.9 To prevent their experiments from lasting too long, they program the computer
to terminate the bargaining once the number of rounds exceeds 20 while informing their participants
only that a game would be terminated by the experimenters if it lasted “too long.” Based on an
analysis of their experimental data on final agreements, initial o↵ers, the number of rounds to reach
9Rapoport et al. (1990) actually implement fixed costs per round of disagreement rather than constant shrink rates.
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agreement and the characteristics of countero↵ers, they reject most basic predictions of the Rubinstein
(1982) model and argue for the importance of fairness concerns. In particular, they observe neither a
significant proposer advantage nor any significant cost advantage.
Zwick, Rapoport, and Howard (1992) experimentally study an environment in which the number
of bargaining periods is unlimited and the pie’s value is fixed but bargaining is subject to exogenous
random termination. This takes the form of a constant and commonly known breakdown probability.
They implement three di↵erent such probabilities of breakdown in a between-subjects design. Based
on their experimental results, they also reject basic predictions of the Rubinstein (1982) model; e.g.,
average Round-1 demands are the same under a breakdown probability of 1￿10 as under a breakdown
probability of 5￿6. Furthermore, they reject the equal split solution.
Like Weg et al. (1990) earlier, Binmore, Swierzbinski, and Tomlinson (2007) employ a shrinking-
pie design with unequal discount factors. They also adopt a similar forced termination procedure:
participants are informed that there will be exogenous termination but not of the exact rule. In fact,
the computer intervenes and terminates the game after a randomly drawn number of rounds ranging
from 3 to 7. These authors find some behavioral support for the basic predictions of the Rubinstein
(1982) model, especially for a proposer advantage. Unlike any of the above studies and ours, however,
they have a long and incentivized training/conditioning phase where participants play against a robot
programmed to a specific strategy; they also do not implement the deterministic alternating-o↵ers
protocol but instead a random proposer protocol, where the proposer of any round is always randomly
chosen from the two players with equal probability; moreover, the pie in their experiment consists of
lottery tickets.
Notably, none of these studies features any payo↵ delay. The domain of outcomes over which
preferences are defined is either that of immediate monetary rewards or of lotteries over monetary
rewards.10 Hence, none of these studies speaks directly to the question of whether time preferences
matter in bargaining; in particular, by their design, they cannot address whether patience is a source of
bargaining power, which is the focus of our study, where we implement significant delays to payo↵s.11
Another distinctive feature of our study is that we focus on general comparative statics predictions
under di↵erent theories of time preferences rather than testing particular point predictions against
each other.
Regarding our basic question of whether time preferences matter in bargaining, the most closely
related work is an unpublished experiment by Manzini (2001). However, her design and also her
10Somewhat relatedly, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) conclude from their experimental findings that “risk preferences
are not time preferences.”
11Of course, it is straightforward to provide assumptions under which the games thus implemented are formally
equivalent to special cases of the Rubinstein (1982) model with exponentially discounted utility. This only means that
one may appeal to this equivalence in order to obtain the predictions from that original model under these (more or
less stringent) assumptions. It does not mean, however, that one learns anything about how time preferences a↵ect
the bargaining outcome; as an analogy, one obviously could not measure time preferences without having any delayed
options.
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conclusion are radically di↵erent from ours. She first elicits participants’ limit prices for avoiding
a delay of one and two months, respectively, of a given monetary prize that is otherwise paid the
next day, via a variation of the BDM (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964) procedure. Then, she
pairs the participants for a single bargaining game with alternating o↵ers over just two rounds, so the
second round is an ultimatum game. Immediate agreement results in payment the subsequent day,
whereas delayed agreement results in payment with a month’s delay.12 Providing the bargainers with
information on their respective limit prices for a month’s delay, this turns out to have no significant
correlation with the opening o↵ers.13 Hence, she concludes that time preferences do not matter in
bargaining and suggests that the task of bargaining distracts attention completely away from time
considerations.
Although very carefully designed, the negative conclusion from Manzini (2001) hinges crucially on
two assumptions, both related to the participants’ incomplete information regarding their opponent’s
preferences. First, it assumes that participants trust the measure of their opponent’s time preference,
which includes trust that the opponent understood the elicitation procedure. Second, it assumes that
participants’ preferences involve no other concerns confounding time preferences, particularly fairness
concerns. We consider these very strong assumptions that are unlikely to hold in the interaction.
We also implemented a time preference elicitation task after all bargaining was completed, to check
the random assignment in terms of our participants’ underlying time preferences and to see whether
conventional measures of time preferences explain bargaining behavior; we find that they hardly do
so, in confirmation of the approach we take here (see Appendix F for details). Indeed, we ascribe
our very di↵erent findings to the way our design deals with incomplete information; by transparently
manipulating e↵ective time preferences, our procedure appears very powerful for establishing a set-
ting in which both individuals share an understanding of who is “more patient” and translate this
understanding into bargaining power.
3 Theoretical Background
We now present the bargaining game that we implement in our experiment, characterize its unique
equilibrium under full generality with regards to time preferences, and show how it is a generalization
of the classic Rubinstein (1982) model. In doing so, we highlight two alternative interpretations of
the latter in terms of the timing of o↵ers versus payo↵s and point out how each of these relates to
assumptions about time preferences. All formal proofs are in Appendix A.
12Indeed, this is the only other bargaining study we know of that implements delayed payo↵s.
13She also studies two additional treatments implementing shrinking pies in a way that is comparable to the treatment




Consider two individuals i ∈ {1,2} deciding on how to share a fixed monetary amount via indefinite
alternating-o↵ers bargaining as in Rubinstein (1982). For simplicity, normalize the amount to one, so
divisions correspond to shares, and assume it is perfectly divisible. In any round n ∈ N, one individual
i proposes a division x ∈ {(x1, x2) ∶ x1 ∈ [0,1] and x2 = 1 − x1} to the other individual j = 3− i (we will
use this convention for i and j throughout), who can then either accept or reject. If the proposal is
accepted, there is agreement, and the game ends; if the proposal is rejected, then the game continues
to round n+1, where this protocol is repeated with reversed roles such that j proposes and i responds.
Player 1 makes the proposal in round 1, and the game continues until a proposal is accepted. Denoting
by rn the responding player of round n, rn = 2 for n odd, and rn = 1 for n even.
We assume consequentialist individuals who distinguish outcomes only according to whether there
is agreement and, if so, how much they obtain at what point in time. Importantly, we decouple rounds
and delays, which is the key innovation of our experimental design. While bargaining itself takes
essentially no time because o↵ers are so frequent that there is negligible delay between rounds, any
disagreement nonetheless entails a significant payo↵ delay. For the general model, we allow this payo↵
delay to be arbitrary and to di↵er between individuals and rounds. Therefore, we specify the domain
of individual i’s preferences as any (q, n) ∈ ([0,1] ×N) ∪ {(0,∞)}, where (0,∞) subsumes any infinite
history (perpetual disagreement). We assume these preferences to have a utility representation Ui that
satisfies general discounted utility; i.e., for each individual i ∈ {1,2}, there exist a delay discounting
function di and an atemporal utility function ui such that
Ui (q, n) = di (n − 1) ⋅ ui (q) ,
and that satisfy the following three properties:
1. (Delay Discounting) di (0) = 1 > di (n) > di (n + 1) > 0 = di (∞) for all n ∈ N;
2. (Atemporal Utility) ui ∶ [0,1] → [0,1] is continuous and strictly increasing from u (0) = 0 to
u (1) = 1;14
3. (Intertemporal Utility) There exists ↵i < 1 such that for all n ∈ N, and for all q ∈ [0,1) and
q′ ∈ (q,1],
u−1i ( i (n) ⋅ ui (q′)) − u−1i ( i (n) ⋅ ui (q)) ≤ ↵i ⋅ (q′ − q) ,
where  i (n) ≡ di (n) ￿di (n − 1).
The discounting function di(n − 1) gives the discount factor for the total payo↵ delay associated
with agreement being reached in round n, i.e., after (n − 1) rounds of disagreement. The expression
 i (n) is the discount factor for the specific period of payo↵ delay caused by disagreement in round n;
14The assumption that u (1) = 1 is a mere normalization and without loss of generality.
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by property 1, it lies between zero and one. Note that di (n) =∏nm=1  i (m) holds true, subject to the
convention that the “empty product” equals one.
Properties 1 and 2 define the bargaining problem: on the one hand, any round of disagreement
causes (further) payo↵ delay, which is costly to both individuals because they are impatient, and on
the other hand, each of them always wants more of the cake for herself.
Property 3 guarantees uniqueness of equilibrium by ensuring that backwards-induction dynamics
are well-behaved. It says that i’s willingness to pay to avoid another round’s delay is always increasing
in the amount that she would obtain in case of this delay. This property extends what has been termed
“increasing loss to delay” (see the axiomatic formulation of Rubinstein, 1982 and its treatment in Os-
borne and Rubinstein, 1990b) or “immediacy” (see the utility formulation of Schweighofer-Kodritsch,
2018) to the non-stationary setting studied here, and it is implied by standard assumptions; e.g., ui
concave and supn  i (n) < 1.15
To see that the Rubinstein (1982) model is a special case, simply let  i(n) be a constant for each
individual i. Given exponential discounting, this means that the payo↵ delay associated with any
round of disagreement is of the same length.16
3.2 Equilibrium
Our equilibrium notion for this extensive-form game of perfect information is that of subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium (SPNE). SPNE outcomes of a more general version of this game, where bargaining
is over a general time-varying surplus, are geometrically analyzed by Binmore (1987), who shows that
the extreme utilities are obtained in history-independent SPNE. Coles and Muthoo (2003) establish
existence for a version of that game, which also contains our model. We contribute here a uniqueness
result and a characterization for general discounted utility where non-stationary discounting is the
source of time-varying surplus, and we provide algebraic proofs.
Lemma 1. There exists a unique sequence xn such that, for all n ∈ N,
xn = 1 − u−1rn ( rn (n) ⋅ urn (xn+1)) . (3.1)
15Let u be concave, q0 < q1 and " > 0. Then
u (q0 + ") − u (q0)
"
≥ u (q1 + ") − u (q1)
"
>  u (q1 + ") −  u (q1)
"
for any   < 1. Moreover, if u (q0) =  u (q1), then u (q0 + ") >  u (q1 + ") follows immediately from the above. This is
equivalent to " > u−1 ( u (q1 + ")) − q0 and upon substituting q0 = u−1 ( u (q1)) to " > u−1 ( u (q1 + ")) − u−1 ( u (q1)).
Denoting q ≡ q1 and q′ ≡ q1 + ", and applying this to individual i’s preferences, the third assumed property follows for
any given n; supn  i (n) < 1 ensures boundedness away from equality across all n by ruling out that limn→∞   (n)→ 1.
16Even when it reduces to that of Rubinstein (1982), the model is not susceptible to the “smallest-units” critique of
van Damme, Selten, and Winter (1990) because despite the frequent o↵ers, any disagreement still entails substantial
payo↵ delay.
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Proposition 1. There exists a unique equilibrium. This unique equilibrium is in history-independent
strategies that imply immediate agreement in every round. It is characterized by the unique sequence
xn of lemma 1 as follows: in round n, the respective proposer demands share xn, and the respective
respondent accepts a demand q if and only if q ≤ xn.
Proposition 1 delivers a general characterization of SPNE. It has the familiar property that in each
round, the proposer makes the smallest acceptable o↵er to the respondent, given the unique continu-
ation agreement that results from rejection. Hence, in terms of time preferences as of a given round
n, only the respondent’s discount factor for that round’s delay  rn (n) enters the equilibrium outcome.
In the special case where the model reduces to Rubinstein’s, which will serve as our benchmark, the
infinite sequence in (3.1) reduces to two equations:
x1 = 1 − u−12 ( 2 ⋅ u2 (x2)) ,
x2 = 1 − u−11 ( 1 ⋅ u1 (x1)) .
We generate several behavioral predictions from this exponential-discounting benchmark for our con-
crete experimental treatments, and we employ the general characterization to also derive the behavioral
predictions from various alternative forms of discounting (in particular, quasi-hyperbolic discounting
capturing a present bias). We present all of these theoretical predictions in Section 4 after defining
our specific treatments.
3.3 Dynamic Consistency and Alternative Interpretation
With frequent o↵ers, the time that passes between decisions is negligible. Hence, preferences are
“trivially” dynamically consistent. Essentially, a single self of the individual makes all the strategic
decisions, and thus, only this one temporal snapshot of preferences matters (sometimes called “com-
mitment preferences”). This a↵ords our model full generality in terms of time preferences, as it avoids
any of the strategic complications arising from dynamic inconsistency that actually manifests itself
throughout the game.17
In fact, dynamic consistency is the only substantial restriction our model imposes: Each individual’s
preferences over various outcomes (q, n) are represented by a single utility function Ui as above, and
at any point in the game, she consistently maximizes this utility.18 This means that our model allows
17For an analysis of dynamically inconsistent but stable time preferences when bargaining itself does take significant
time and is therefore subject also to intra-personal conflict, see Schweighofer-Kodritsch (2018). However, the general
model here can even accommodate dynamically inconsistent preferences that are time-varying because any variation over
time is negligible for the strategic interaction with frequent o↵ers; e.g., an individual may discount utility exponentially
at every point in time but exhibit a higher discount factor on one day than another. For the purposes of our game, her
preferences satisfy exponential discounting even though they are dynamically inconsistent across calendar time.
18We focus on the separable case of discounted utility merely to notationally ease the exposition. It is relatively
straightforward to formulate the three assumed properties for non-separable preferences and to then generalize our
uniqueness and characterization result using the same line of proof.
11
not only for arbitrary (though costly) payo↵ delays upon any disagreement but also delays between
rounds. As stressed before, when the latter is negligible, preferences are dynamically consistent by the
game’s design. However, under the assumption that preferences are truly dynamically consistent, the
model accommodates also any setting where bargaining takes a significant amount of time and payo↵s
may be delayed by the process of bargaining itself. In particular, we may replace rounds n with actual
time t, so that there is a significant delay between rounds of bargaining and payo↵s occur immediately
upon agreement. This is the usual formulation and interpretation of the Rubinstein (1982) model.
From this perspective, our model generalizes this classic model from exponential discounting to any
dynamically consistent discounting.19
To summarize, the bargaining game we implement in our experiment may appear somewhat ar-
tificial, but it has several important practical advantages for our experimental investigation over the
usual interpretation of alternating-o↵ers bargaining with a significant delay between rounds of o↵ers
(see our introductory discussion in Section 4 below). Moreover, under the assumption of dynamic
consistency (or a mere common belief in such consistency), it is also equivalent to a game with the
usual interpretation. Proposition 1 and any behavioral predictions derived from it then directly extend
to the usual setting where bargaining itself takes time. This applies in particular to the special case of
our model with exponential discounting, which is equivalent to Rubinstein (1982) and will therefore
serve as our benchmark.
4 Experimental Design and Behavioral Predictions
In this section, we first introduce our general experimental approach to testing predictions of the
bargaining theory based on time preferences. We then describe our concrete experimental design and
subsequently present the behavioral predictions for the specific treatments. We conclude the section
by providing further administrative details.
4.1 General Approach
The theory of bargaining developed here focuses on time preferences as the strategic determinant of
bargaining outcomes. When it comes to testing its predictions experimentally, a researcher first faces
the challenge that she does not know the participants’ preferences. Equation (3.1) demonstrates that
the theory’s point prediction is potentially influenced by an infinite number of discounting parameters
together with the shape of the atemporal utility functions, whose elicitation would not be practically
19Non-exponential but dynamically consistent discounting means that discounting may vary with absolute (calendar)
time but not the passage of time; e.g., an individual’s discount factor for the first week of January 2022 may di↵er from
her discount factor for the second week of January 2022, but both of these discount factors are the same regardless of
when the individual considers these delays. See Halevy (2015) for further elaboration and experimental investigation of
the relationships between stationarity, dynamic consistency and time invariance (and their respective violations).
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feasible. Moreover, preferences most likely include concerns other than time preferences, particularly
fairness concerns (as demonstrated by the ultimatum game; see Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze,
1982). For this reason, we design our experiment to test comparative statics predictions regarding time
preferences rather than point predictions. In other words, we ask whether time preferences matter as
predicted despite various other possible concerns.
Second, and in contrast to the theory, the players themselves also do not know their opponent’s
(time, risk, social) preferences. Put simply, the basic goal of our design is to establish a setting where
both individuals have a shared understanding of who is more “patient,” which we would argue is
the setting to which the theory is really meant to apply. Our key innovation towards this goal is
to randomly assign participants their individual payo↵ delay structures and to make this assignment
commonly known within each matched bargaining pair. Thus, we create groups of individuals with
the same distribution of general preferences (including various concerns) but e↵ectively di↵erent time
preferences. Assumptions on the structure of underlying time preferences then translate into shifts
in relative bargaining power via predicted shifts in patience, and making both individuals’ “types”
common knowledge then implies common beliefs about who will be at an advantage in terms of their
e↵ective time preferences. We derive such comparative statics predictions for the most important
classes of time preferences without any parametric assumptions, and we test them by comparing the
associated distributions of behavioral outcome measures for di↵erent types.
4.2 Experimental Design
Table 1 presents our experimental design, which contains three experimental treatments. Each treat-
ment corresponds to a particular pairing of “bargainer types,” where this type corresponds to the
exogenously imposed payo↵ delay that an individual faces for any possible disagreement. To credibly
implement meaningful payo↵ delay, we relied on the popular mobile payment system Venmo.20
In Treatment WM, one bargainer faces one week of delay per round of disagreement, whereas the
other faces one month of such delay. TreatmentWM2D is similar, but both bargainers additionally face
a front-end delay of one week; i.e., now immediate agreements also result in one week of payo↵ delay.
In Treatment WW1D, both bargainers face the same delay of one week per round of disagreement, but
one of them additionally faces a front-end delay of one week. In the rest of the paper, we will call the
bargainer whose payment window is weekly/monthly/delayed a weekly/monthly/delayed bargainer.
Within a given treatment, all games are played by a particular pair of di↵erent types, and everyone
20Venmo is a service provided by PayPal that allows account holders to transfer funds to others via a mobile phone
app. It handled $12 billion in transactions during the first quarter of 2018 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/venmo). For
more information, please visit https://help.venmo.com/hc/en-us/articles/210413477. When recruiting our participants,
we clearly announced that those without a Venmo account were not eligible to participate in the experiment. At the end
of the experiment, the participants were asked to report their account information for payment, including username and
email address details. None of the participants reported any error or di culty in providing this information, suggesting
that all our participants were su ciently familiar with Venmo in their daily lives.
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Table 1: Experimental Treatments
Bargainer 1
Bargainer 2
Monthly with D Monthly Weekly with D
Weekly with D WM2D N/A N/A
Weekly N/A WM WW1D
*Note: Delay (D) = 1 Week
anonymously plays ten games. Participants are always randomly rematched subject to the treatment
condition. Moreover, the initial proposer is always determined by chance, so we observe both versions
of the game in terms of which type is the initial proposer. For instance, in every game of Treatment
WM, a weekly bargainer plays against a monthly bargainer, and half of the games have a weekly
bargainer as the initial proposer and a monthly bargainer as the initial respondent; the other half
have a monthly bargainer as the initial proposer and a weekly bargainer as the initial respondent. We
can compare these two kinds of games within treatments to measure and test for a basic proposer
advantage.
Our focus is on testing comparative statics with respect to time preferences, however, and we
now sketch how our treatments deliver such tests. Details and formal derivations of the behavioral
predictions to be tested follow below in Section 4.3. Whenever a weekly and a monthly bargainer
are matched, one transparently faces a longer delay and therefore greater cost of disagreement than
the other for all commonly considered time preferences. Thus, we can test whether e↵ectively greater
patience translates into a strategic advantage in terms of a more favorable bargaining outcome. Intro-
ducing a front-end delay additionally allows us to test the prediction from exponential discounting that
only a “marginal” delay but not a “fixed” delay matters—akin to marginal v. fixed/sunk cost—against
the alternative of present bias or also future bias. Observe here that our treatments produce such tests
not only within treatments (across the two kinds of games) but also across treatments (weekly bar-
gainers appear in both WM and WW1D, and delayed weekly bargainers appear in both WM2D and
WW1D).
In the following, we highlight the key components of our experimental design and compare them
with the conventional designs used in the related literature. The full experimental instructions for
Treatment WM can be found in Appendix D.
E↵ective Discounting Procedure and Payo↵ Delay. Unlike the shrinking-pie design, the size of
the surplus in our experiment is fixed, at US$50 (500 tokens), and we use the novel experimental ma-
nipulation proposed by Kim (2019b), the “e↵ective discounting procedure,” to control time preferences
and implement payo↵s over a potentially long period of time.21 More precisely, we exogenously control
21Kim (2019b) develops the design to investigate the e↵ect of time preferences on cooperative behavior in an infinitely
repeated game.
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the e↵ective discounting of our participants by changing the payment delay of bargaining payo↵s at
the individual level, which is either a week or month per round to agreement and may include an addi-
tional front-end delay of one week. For instance, in Treatment WM, the weekly bargainer receives the
payo↵ from an agreement in Round n in (n− 1) week(s) from the day of the experiment; the monthly
bargainer receives her payo↵ in (n − 1) month(s) from the day of the experiment. Appendix D illus-
trates how the payment schedule is presented to participants in this treatment. With the additional
front-end delay in Treatment WM2D, the now delayed weekly and monthly bargainers receive their
payo↵ in n week(s) and in (n − 1) month(s) plus one week, respectively. Assuming ( ,  )-discounting
(i.e., quasi-hyperbolic discounting), any present (or near-future) bias will vanish with such a front-end
delay, and this will also be true with more general forms of such a bias.22 Our choice of basic delays
of a week versus a month intends to ensure salient di↵erences in bargainers’ e↵ective discounting in
the respective treatments, in spite of interests rates that are close to zero and of the aforementioned
likely relevance of concerns other than time preferences.
Fixed Types and Random Rematching. To minimize any potential confusion among partici-
pants regarding their incentives and payment schedule, we randomly assigned every participant their
“bargainer type” at the beginning of the session and fixed it throughout the entire experiment. The
participants then played multiple games as usual, where they were randomly rematched after each
game, subject to the particular treatment’s pairing specification. Within any match, the types of
both players were made common knowledge at the very beginning of the game; see the screenshots in
Appendix E.
Probabilistic Termination. In addition to payo↵ delay, we also implemented exogenous termination
with a fixed, commonly known termination probability of 25%. By contrast, previous studies of the
Rubinstein (1982) model, such as Zwick et al. (1992), have employed probabilistic termination as the
sole cost of disagreement and studied the e↵ects of varying the termination probability on outcomes.23
Importantly, in our experiment, the same 25% termination probability was transparently applied to
all rounds of all games in all treatments. As a result, even if risk attitudes enter preferences, they
could not be a significant source of the behavioral di↵erences we observe. This design choice serves
two related purposes. First, it ensures that every bargaining game, while still indefinite, is expected to
end after a reasonable amount of time and, upon its conclusion, to be promptly followed by the next
one, which is important for the credibility as well as the smooth running of our experiment. Second,
this design theoretically keeps bargainers further away from possible indi↵erence to delay as required
by Property 3 of our preference assumptions. Of course, in terms of our model, discounting should be
viewed as also including this constant risk (assuming expected utility).24
22There is no consensus on how long this delay needs to be to make any present or (near-) future bias negligible. In
his related experiment on the repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, Kim (2019b) finds that the cooperation rate is significantly
higher in a treatment with a payo↵ delay of one month per round than in a treatment with no payo↵ delay, suggesting
that a month may be an upper bound.
23See also Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018) for the use of the probabilistic termination in infinitely repeated games.
24With expected utility, a constant probability of breakdown simply proportionally reduces each  i(n) by this fraction,
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Deterministic Roles. At the beginning of the first round of every bargaining game, the initial
proposer/responder roles were randomly determined, which in turn determined the individuals’ roles
for all subsequent rounds via the alternating-o↵ers protocol. This is in contrast to experiments studying
random-proposer bargaining protocols, where the proposer is randomly determined in every round ;
Binmore et al. (2007) is the most closely related such experiment.
4.3 Behavioral Predictions
We now employ Proposition 1 to derive the behavioral predictions that our experiment is designed to
test. These concern the basic theoretical implications of the most important classes of time preferences
with regards to e ciency and distribution. E ciency of bargaining (immediate agreement) is a general
implication. The distribution of surplus (bargaining power) depends on who is the initial proposer
(proposer advantage) and on the two bargainers’ specific time preferences (“patience advantage”). All
formal proofs are in Appendix A.
We begin by establishing the important and influential benchmark predictions from exponential
discounting, as in Rubinstein (1982), and subsequently highlight the di↵erential predictions under the
most important alternative forms of discounting as observed empirically – in particular, present bias
as in quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In each case, to capture the implied “typical” behavior, we impose
preference symmetry: i.e., both individuals have the same atemporal utility function, u1 = u2 = u, and
for the same future delay  t,t′ from some given date t > 0 to some later date t′ > t, discount utility
with the same discount factor  t,t′ . Note that by implementing idiosyncratic payo↵ delays (bargainer
types), our e↵ective discounting procedure nonetheless induces variation in the cost of disagreement
within and across matches/treatments.
Exponential Discounting (EXD). Since any given bargainer type faces the same payo↵ delay
from any round of disagreement, the stationarity property of EXD implies that any such delay is
discounted with the same discount factor, irrespective of any front-end delay. Let   ∈ (0,1) be the
(common) discount factor for a weekly delay, and let    be the (common) discount factor for a monthly
delay, where 0 <   < 1.25 Using notation  i ∈ { ,1} with  i = 1 if and only if bargainer i is a weekly
bargainer, any bargainer i’s type is fully captured by  i, such that Ui (q, n) = ( i )n−1 u (q) and
 i(n) =  i  is constant across rounds n. Both WM and WM2D correspond to pairing {1, }, and
WW1D corresponds to pairing {1,1}.
whereby it is captured by our model. It should be noted, however, that certain violations of expected utility yield
dynamic inconsistency even across rounds, in contrast to our model. In particular, Halevy (2008) argues that the future
is inherently uncertain and shows how empirically plausible non-linear probability weighting of future consumption risk
provides a foundation of present bias and diminishing impatience. Since Schweighofer-Kodritsch (2018) finds that this
form of dynamic inconsistency does not upset any of the qualitative equilibrium predictions of the benchmark under
dynamic consistency, we abstract from risk as a potential source of dynamic inconsistency.
25If we take a month to equal four weeks, then    =  4 pins down   =  3.
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Prediction 1. Symmetric EXD implies:
(1) E ciency: There is always immediate agreement.
(2) Proposer Advantage: In every treatment, a given bargainer type obtains a greater share as
the initial proposer than as the initial respondent.
(3) Basic Delay Advantage: For a given initial role (proposer or respondent):
(3a) In both Treatments WM and WM2D, the weekly bargainer obtains a greater share than
the monthly bargainer.
(3b) Across Treatments WM and WW1D, the weekly bargainer obtains a greater share against
the monthly bargainer (WM ) than against the delayed weekly bargainer (WW1D).
(3c) Across Treatments WM2D and WW1D, the delayed weekly bargainer obtains a greater
share against the delayed monthly bargainer (WM2D) than against the non-delayed weekly
bargainer (WW1D).
(4) Front-End Delay Neutrality: For a given initial role (proposer or respondent):
(4a) In Treatment WW1D, both types of bargainer obtain the same share.
(4b) Across Treatments WM and WM2D, bargainer types with the same basic delay (weekly or
monthly) obtain the same share.
E ciency (1) and Proposer Advantage (2) are well-understood predictions. For the comparative
statics predictions in e↵ective time preferences, (3) and (4), simply note that with EXD front-end delay
is strategically irrelevant, so that the Treatments WM and WM2D become equivalent and Treatment
WW1D becomes symmetric; the predictions are then an immediate consequence of the fact that any
weekly bargainer is e↵ectively more patient than any monthly one.26
Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting (QHD). Present bias, the excessive weight put on immediate
rewards relative to delayed rewards, is the most important deviation from EXD. By adding a single
parameter   ∈ (0,1), the model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting parsimoniously captures this empiri-
cally well-established phenomenon. Given that all o↵ers are made at the same date, the bias may play
a role only in the first round, because upon failure to agree immediately all possible payo↵s lie in the
future. Moreover, it will do so only when the initial respondent faces no front-end delay, because the
proposer’s discounting of the first round’s delay is irrelevant anyways, due to the proposer’s strategic
advantage, and a front-end delay for the respondent pushes any immediate-agreement payo↵ into the
26It seems worthwhile pointing out that whereas the Proposer Advantage (2) concerns a comparison across the two
possible initial role assignments for the same type, the comparative statics predictions (3) and (4) concern comparisons
across types for the same initial role assignment.
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future. Keeping the earlier EXD notation and adding  i ∈ { ,1} with  i = 1 if and only if bargainer i is
not delayed, any bargainer i’s type is fully captured by ( i, i), such that Ui (q, n) =  i ( i )n−1 u (q);
now  i(1) =  i i  and, for n > 1,  i(n) =  i  ≥  i(1). WM2D corresponds to pairing {(1,1) , ( ,1)},
WM corresponds to pairing {(1, ) , ( , )}, and WW1D corresponds to pairing {(1, ) , (1,1)}.
Prediction 2. Symmetric QHD implies (1) and (2) as under EXD, and
(3’) Qualified Basic Delay Advantage: (3a,3b) as under EXD, and
(3c’) Across Treatments WM2D and WW1D, the delayed weekly bargainer obtains a greater
share against the delayed monthly bargainer (WM2D) than against the non-delayed weekly
bargainer (WW1D) as the initial respondent, but the respective ranking for the delayed
weekly bargainer’s share as the initial proposer is ambiguous in general.
(4’) Front-End Delay Advantage:
(4a’) In Treatment WW1D, the delayed weekly bargainer obtains a greater share than the weekly
bargainer, both as initial proposer and as initial respondent.
(4b’) Across Treatments WM and WM2D, bargainer types with the same basic delay (weekly or
monthly) obtain a greater (resp., smaller) share in WM than in WM2D as initial proposer
(resp., respondent).
Immediate agreement, hence E ciency (1), is a general prediction. For the remaining ones, note
that from Round 2 (which is o↵-path, of course) the game proceeds as under EXD. Hence, a present
bias in the sense of   < 1 kicks in only if the initial respondent is not delayed, in which case it could
only reinforce the Proposer Advantage (2). Due to this advantage, the initial proposer’s   does not
a↵ect the equilibrium agreement, whereby any front-end delay to the initial proposer’s payo↵ has no
e↵ect under QHD.
For (3a), the prediction within Treatment WM2D is therefore immediate from EXD. Within Treat-
ment WM, a weekly bargainer as initial respondent would obtain a better deal after rejecting than a
monthly one would and with the same present bias is more patient about the first delay; therefore,
she obtains a greater share in the immediate agreement, where the proposer’s o↵er always makes the
respondent indi↵erent to rejecting. A similar argument applies when we compare a weekly bargainer’s
share as initial respondent against a monthly bargainer (WM ) with that against a delayed weekly
bargainer (WW1D), because rejection results in a better deal in the former case; for the remaining
part of (3b) and the weekly bargainer as initial proposer, note that a present bias makes a monthly
respondent even weaker relative to the delayed weekly respondent.
The part of (3c’) that coincides with EXD’s (3c) has the initial respondent delayed, so it is indeed
immediate from (3c). Now compare a delayed weekly bargainer as the initial proposer against a
delayed monthly bargainer (WM2D) and against a weekly bargainer (WW1D). Although the Round-2
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(o↵-path) continuation agreement would have the monthly one weaker due to her longer basic delay,
present bias only a↵ects the (non-delayed) weekly respondent and may overturn the EXD prediction.
The comparison therefore depends on how strong present bias   is relative to long-run discounting  .
Finally, both parts of Prediction (4’) are straightforward from the fact that a delayed bargainer
is stronger than a non-delayed bargainer with the same basic delay. The symmetry in (4a) within
Treatment WW1D under EXD is therefore broken in favor of the delayed weekly bargainer (4a’). The
logic of part (4b’) across Treatments WM and WM2D follows similarly, upon recalling that the initial
proposer’s present bias   is irrelevant.
Other Forms of Discounting. Due to the tractability they a↵ord, EXD and QHD are, by far,
the most important models of time preferences for theoretical analyses. However, empirical studies,
especially from psychology, suggest hyperbolic discounting—also known as diminishing impatience,
which implies present bias—as more “universal” form of discounting. At the same time, experimental
studies from economics also document the “opposite” of present bias, namely (near-) future bias. We
now discuss the implications of these alternatives.
First, consider hyperbolic discounting, where  i (n) is increasing in n. Since it implies a present
bias, a front-end delay increases such a discounter’s bargaining power as the respondent. However,
disagreement in round n adds a shorter payo↵ delay to a shorter delay for a weekly bargainer than a
monthly bargainer, meaning that for n large enough a monthly bargainer may in general become more
patient than a weekly bargainer. This would resonate through the entire recursion of equation (3.1),
thereby a↵ecting the equilibrium outcome. Based on intuition that discounting for the same additional
delay would not change too quickly with the preceding delay (except for the immediate present) and
the sizable termination probability, we assume that the e↵ect of pushing delays further into the future
does not outweigh the e↵ect of longer delays in determining the immediate equilibrium agreement.
Notably, the leading models of hyperbolic discounting are all special cases of the discounting function
d(t) = (1 − ↵ ⋅ t)− ￿↵ (with ↵,  > 0) proposed by Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), and for any such
discounting our design ensures that the cost of disagreement is always lower for a weekly bargainer
than for a monthly bargainer (also when both are delayed).27 Loosely speaking, hyperbolic discounting
then remains su ciently similar to constant discounting for any delay that starts in the future, such
that by continuity, the only qualitative di↵erence from EXD within our treatments is a present bias,
as captured by QHD. Across treatments, however, hyperbolic discounting still introduces another
possibility: even when restricted to the above functional form, it remains ambiguous whether the
weekly (with no delay) or the delayed monthly bargainer type is more patient (although one can show
27The reason is that the di↵erent delays per round have a constant ratio, which also equals the ratio of total delays
the two bargainers face in any agreement. Measuring time t in the unit that is the shorter delay per round and
letting the corresponding type be type A, A’s discount factor for round n is  A(n) = [(1 − ↵ ⋅ n)￿(1 − ↵ ⋅ (n − 1))]− ￿↵;
letting the longer delay be k > 1 times the shorter delay with corresponding type B, B’s discount factor for round n is
 B(n) = [(1 − ↵ ⋅ kn)￿(1 − ↵ ⋅ k(n − 1))]− ￿↵. Basic algebra yields  A(n) >  B(n), and it is straightforward to check that
the same holds true if both A and B face the same front-end delay.
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that they can always be ordered). This renders hyperbolic discounting altogether permissive with
respect to Predictions (3c/3c’) and (4b/4b’).
Finally, consider also near-future bias. Somewhat loosely, this means that the discounting function
is initially concave (hump-shaped), in contrast to the convex discounting functions under EXD, QHD
or hyperbolic discounting. While empirically documented, it is neither known how prevalent this
bias is (hence, whether it could be reasonably expected to guide typical behavior) nor how far the
“near” future extends from the immediate present (hence, whether a week’s front-end delay could be
reasonably expected to mute it). In view of these open issues, we omit a detailed analysis but note
that if a near-future bias operates like “inverted” present bias in QHD—i.e., 1 <   < 1￿ —then it would
simply yield the mirror image of the di↵erential predictions of QHD from EXD because a front-end
delay would then make the initial respondent weaker rather than stronger.28
Summary Immediate agreement and a proposer advantage are fundamental theoretical implications
for bargaining. While our experiment is set up to test these as well, its main innovation and focus
concern comparative statics in time preferences. The idea that patience is power in bargaining becomes
somewhat complex with any violation of EXD since there is then no simple measure of patience to apply
at every stage of bargaining. As argued, under mild restrictions, a basic delay advantage in the sense
of prediction (3a) may be considered a fundamental theoretical implication as well. Focusing on QHD
as parsimoniously capturing the key empirical deviation from EXD (among all forms of present-biased
discounting), the major distinctive implication for our experiment to test is that a front-end delay
increases an initial respondent’s bargaining power (rather than having no e↵ect), which underlies
all of its di↵erential predictions. Under minimal restrictions, hyperbolic discounting maintains the
fundamental predictions together with the key distinctive prediction of QHD but is otherwise more
permissive.
4.4 Administrative Details
Our experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) at the University of California, Irvine.
A total of 348 subjects who had no prior experience with our experiment were recruited from the
graduate and undergraduate student population of the university. Upon arrival at the laboratory,
the participants were instructed to sit at separate computer terminals. Each received a copy of the
experiment’s instructions. To ensure that the information contained in the instructions was induced
as public knowledge, these instructions were read aloud, and the reading was accompanied by slide
illustrations followed by a comprehension quiz.
Each session employed a single treatment, and we conducted 6 sessions for each treatment, for a
28Specifically, rather than qualifying prediction (3c), which would then carry over from EXD, such bias would qualify
(3b) to not necessarily hold anymore for the weekly bargainer as the initial proposer, and it would change “greater” to
“smaller” in predictions (4a’) and (4b’).
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total of 18 sessions (6 sessions × 3 treatments). In all sessions, the participants played 10 games under
the corresponding treatment condition, say matching bargainer types A and B. At the beginning of
the experiment, one half of the participants were randomly assigned to be Type A and the other half
to be Type B. Individual participants’ types remained fixed throughout the session. We used the
random-matching protocol (across matches, subject to the treatment condition). Each session had
16–20 participants and hence involved 8–10 simultaneous games.
We illustrate the instructions with those for TreatmentWM. The full instructions for this treatment
can be found in Appendix D. For each game, one Type A participant and one Type B participant
were randomly matched. At the very beginning of Round 1, one of the two was randomly chosen to be
the proposer, and the other was the responder. The proposer then proposed how to split 500 tokens
(worth $50) between the two of them as follows:
“ tokens for yourself and tokens for the other person.”
After observing the proposed split, the respondent decided whether to accept or reject it. If the
respondent accepted the proposed split, both participants received their proposed amount in tokens,
and the match was terminated. If the respondent rejected the proposed split, then the match proceeded
to the next round of bargaining with a 75% chance and was terminated with a 25% chance. If a match
was terminated after the rejection of a proposed split, both participants received zero tokens for the
match. If the match proceeded to the next round, then the participant who was the proposer in the
previous round became the respondent, and the participant who was the respondent in the previous
round became the proposer. At the end of the experiment, one of the 10 matches was randomly
selected for payment. For the selected match, if agreement was reached, the delay of the participant’s
payment depended on (1) his/her bargainer type and (2) the round of the agreement.
After all ten matches were over, we measured the participants’ time preferences by using a version of
the BDM (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964) method. We elicited switching points (indi↵erences)
between sooner and later money amounts. One decision was randomly selected for actual payment.29
The tokens our participants earned in the selected match were converted into US dollars at a fixed
and known exchange rate of $0.1 per token. In addition, participants received a show-up payment of
$10. Any amount a participant was due to receive was paid electronically via Venmo, including imme-
diate payments. Earnings were $37.90 on average, and average duration of a session was approximately
1.5 hours.30
29We implemented the elicitation task in 4 sessions per treatment. This allows us to check whether the random
assignment was successfully implemented in terms of participants’ underlying time preferences, which is a crucial aspect
of our design and which our data confirm. In line with Manzini (2001), we find no significant correlations of these
measures with behavior in our experiment, supporting our approach. See Appendix F for details.
30We conducted 6 sessions in May and June, 2018, and 12 sessions in October and December, 2018. The longest delay
among the matches selected for payment was 7 months, and the corresponding amount was paid on May 17, 2019.
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5 Experimental Results
This section presents our experimental results regarding Predictions 1 and 2. First, we take a look
at the basic e ciency property of bargaining outcomes and present empirical evidence regarding the
proposer advantage. Then, we investigate the key predictions regarding any advantage created from
the basic delay and front-end delay manipulation. In the body of this paper, we mainly focus on
the data from the second half of the experiment, after some learning has taken place. In line also
with the literature, we conduct our tests based on comparisons of initial proposals to capture the
bargainers’ perceptions of relative bargaining power. We have these data for every bargainer type in
every treatment, and every participant with a given type played both versions of the game against the
treatment’s given opponent type (i.e., as the initial proposer and as the initial respondent). Notably,
the vast majority of agreements were reached immediately or with only one round of delay, with
highly similar rates across all treatments. In any case, we do find similar results for the first half of the
experiment and when comparing actual immediate agreements; Appendix B includes the supporting
supplementary figures. Finally, we summarize and discuss our findings.
5.1 E ciency and Proposer Advantage
Figure 1: The Proportions of Agreements over Rounds – Last 5 Matches
Figure 1 depicts the proportions of agreements made in Rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4 or after based on the
data from the last 5 matches. The basic picture does not change if we instead use the first 5 matches
only or all 10 matches. In Treatment WM, the vast majority of matches result in agreement reached
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with no delay (72.5%) or one round of delay (12.5%). In Treatments WM2D and WW1D, the broad
picture is highly similar. For all rounds, the proportions of agreement before random termination are
91.8%, 89.3% and 90.5% for Treatments WM, WM2D, and WW1D, respectively.
In all pairwise comparisons between treatments, the acceptance rates in Round 1—i.e., the rates
of immediate agreement—do not significantly di↵er between treatments (one-sided Fisher’s exact test,
p-values > 0.18).31 Figure 10 in Appendix B shows that these rates also do not di↵er significantly
across the two versions of the game within any treatment.
These observations establish that immediate agreement is the rule rather than the exception, and
they suggest that failures to agree are unrelated to the specific pairing of bargainer types and e↵ective
time preferences. Of course, participants make their decisions based on incomplete information, but
this does not seem to cause much delay and ine ciency. The fact that the average number of rounds
for agreement is only slightly above 1.3 also supports that, on average, bargaining achieved very high
levels of e ciency.32
Finally, considering agreements only (recall the risk of exogenous termination) and averaging also
over all treatments, more than 75% are immediate agreements, and approximately 17% are agreements
with a delay of only one round. We summarize this as follows.
Result 1 (E ciency). In every treatment, the vast majority of agreements are reached immediately
or with only one round of delay.
We next explore the proposer advantage in our data based on initial proposals. Figure 2’s left
panel reports the average share for proposers and respondents of each type in each treatment over the
last 5 matches. For every type, the average share for proposers is significantly larger than that for
respondents (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-values < 0.01).33 Moreover, the di↵erences are substantial
in their magnitudes (25–40 tokens).
Of course, not all proposals are accepted, and we would naturally expect more rejections for
proposals that leave less to respondents. Hence, we also consider actually accepted proposals, see
figure 2’s right panel for the last 5 matches, which confirm the advantage of being the initial proposer.34
These observations firmly support the predicted proposer advantage in bargaining when the cost of
disagreement is delay.
Result 2 (Proposer Advantage). In every treatment, given any bargainer type (weekly, monthly, de-
layed), the average share is significantly and substantially larger as proposer than as respondent.
31For a robustness check to control for the size of proposals in Round 1, we also run probit regressions in which a
treatment dummy variable and the respondents’ share are independent variables and the standard errors are clustered at
the session level. For all pairwise comparisons over the last 5 matches, the di↵erence in acceptance rates is insignificant
except for being only marginally significant in the comparison of Treatments WM and WW1D (p-value = 0.059). For
all matches, no pairwise comparison results in a significant di↵erence (p-values > 0.153).
32The average number of rounds for agreement does not di↵er across treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p-values > 0.5).
33Qualitatively the same patterns are observed for the first 5 matches.
34We find a similar confirmation for the first 5 matches and also for actual payo↵s; see appendix B.
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Figure 2: Proposer Advantage – Last 5 Matches’ Proposals
5.2 Basic Delay and Front-End Delay Advantages
To maximize the amount of data for our analyses, we focus on initial proposals, thereby treating them
as equilibrium proposals. Contrary to the equilibrium assuming perfect information, not all proposals
are accepted, of course, due to preference heterogeneity and incomplete information. However, most
are and at very similar rates across conditions. This suggests that the proposers do generally attempt
to reach agreement immediately and that the e↵ect of incomplete information is “constant” across
conditions. Moreover, we obtain similar results when considering actually agreed shares; see Figures
17 through 19 in Appendix B.
Our manipulation is supposed to e↵ectively shift the distribution of time preferences between the
randomly selected groups of bargainer types. We therefore conduct our comparisons based on the entire
observed distributions of initial proposals in terms of the proposer’s claimed share.35 Specifically, we
always examine the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for first-order stochastic dominance, and
we use appropriate unidirectional Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests for statistical significance in this
strong sense. Note that in contrast to comparisons of means, which are always ordered, such order is
not guaranteed here.
Recall that our design produces tests of all predicted comparative statics on within-treatments
data, which we consider first, and on across-treatments data, which follows second.
35The CDF figures that follow below are censored by the given range of [250,310] for ease of graphical representation.
This range contains, on average, more than 95% of the observations in the data. Such truncation does not apply to any
of the statistical analyses.
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5.2.1 Within Treatments
Within treatments, we test for the basic delay advantage according to Prediction (3a), which is common
to both EXD and QHD and concerned with Treatments WM and WM2D : in each of these treatments,
proposals by weekly bargainers are predicted to exceed those by their monthly counterparts in terms
of the proposer’s own share. The other within-treatment test is that of front-end delay neutrality
under EXD, Prediction (4a), vs. front-end delay advantage under QHD, Prediction (4a’). This test
is concerned with treatment WW1D : whereas both bargainer types are predicted to make identical
proposals under EXD, under QHD the delayed type is predicted to claim a larger share of the surplus.
Note that if a Type A’s initial proposals have a larger proposer share than a Type B’s proposals,
this is equivalent to Type A’s being o↵ered a larger respondent share than Type B. Hence, within each
treatment, a single comparison covers the entire respective prediction.
(a) First 5 Matches (b) Last 5 Matches
Figure 3: Round-1 Proposals in Treatment WM
Figure 3 presents the CDF of Round-1 proposals in Treatment WM aggregated over the first 5 matches
(Figure 3(a)) and over the last 5 matches (Figure 3(b)), by bargainer type. The solid line indicates
the CDF for the weekly proposer, and the dotted line indicates the CDF for the monthly proposer. A
few observations are immediate. First, consistent with prior findings, fairness concerns seem to be an
important factor in bargaining.36 Approximately 50% of proposals are equal (250-250) splits. Second,
the CDF of proposals by weekly bargainers clearly lies below that for monthly bargainers already for
the first 5 matches (KS test, p-value = 0.046). This di↵erence remains statistically significant and
becomes even more substantial in magnitude in the last 5 matches (KS test, p-value < 0.01). We
therefore strongly confirm the general Prediction (3a) for Treatment WM. Both matched types act in
accordance with a shared understanding that a longer delay increases the cost of disagreement and
36In fact, this does not require the proposers to be fair-minded; it could be that they have “selfish” preferences but
believe that they are facing a fair-minded respondent.
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weakens bargaining power.
Result 3 (Basic Delay Advantage in Treatment WM ). In Treatment WM, the initial proposals by
weekly bargainers significantly exceed and first-order stochastically dominate those by monthly bargain-
ers.
(a) First 5 Matches (b) Last 5 Matches
Figure 4: Round-1 Proposals in Treatment WM2D
Figure 4 presents the CDF of Round-1 proposals in Treatment WM2D by bargainer type. The
solid line indicates the CDF for the (now delayed) weekly proposer, and the dotted line indicates
the CDF for the (now delayed) monthly proposer. Again, close to 50% of proposals are equal splits.
Unlike in Treatment WM, the distributions of proposals are quite obviously not significantly di↵erent
initially (KS test, p-value = 0.726). However, behavior gravitates towards the theoretical prediction
as the participants gain more experience. In the comparison for the last 5 matches, we observe
the predicted first-order stochastic dominance, although it remains statistically non-significant (KS
test, p-value = 0.262). Restricting attention to proposals that are strictly greater than 250 (meaning
that the proposer claims more than half the surplus), the predicted first-order stochastic dominance
relationship becomes marginally significant (KS test, p-value=0.078).37 Taken together, these findings
also support the general Prediction (3a), although relative to Treatment WM, the front-end delay in
TreatmentWM2D significantly mitigates the basic delay advantage. In other words, it is less clear that
the two bargainer types perceive the longer delay as significantly weakening bargaining power. This
observation is consistent with diminishing impatience, so adding a front-end delay shifts bargaining
power somewhat to the bargainer with longer delays.
37Excluding the observations with equal shares does not harm our analysis for Treatment WM2D because the fre-
quencies of equal-split proposals by weekly and monthly bargainers are not statistically di↵erent (Fisher’s exact test
(one-sided), p-value = 0.378).
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Result 4 (Basic Delay Advantage in Treatment WM2D). In Treatment WM2D, the initial proposals
by delayed weekly bargainers and those by delayed monthly bargainers are not significantly di↵erent in
their distributions. We observe first-order stochastic dominance of the former in the last 5 matches,
where the di↵erence is statistically more significant, especially upon excluding equal splits.
While Treatments WM and WM2D pair two types that di↵er solely in their payo↵ delay per round
of disagreement and therefore permit a straightforward test of the basic delay advantage, Treatment
WW1D is symmetric in this respect. The only asymmetry between types here is that one is facing a
front-end delay while the other is not. Under EXD, this “fixed cost” asymmetry is irrelevant, while it
is an advantage under QHD (present bias).
(a) First 5 Matches (b) Last 5 Matches
Figure 5: Round-1 Proposals in Treatment WW1D
Figure 5 shows the CDF of Round-1 proposals in Treatment WW1D by bargainer type. The
solid line indicates the CDF for the weekly proposer (facing no front-end delay), and the dotted line
indicates the CDF for the delayed weekly proposer. Whereas EXD predicts no di↵erence, it is clear
that the distribution of proposals by delayed weekly bargainers first-order stochastically dominates
that of the weekly bargainers without front-end delay throughout, as alternatively predicted under
QHD. This di↵erence is highly significant both in the first 5 and the last 5 matches (KS test, p-value
< 0.01 and p-value = 0.046, respectively). Hence, the front-end delay neutrality Prediction (4a) for
Treatment WW1D is strongly rejected in favor of the alternative Prediction (4a’) of a front-end delay
advantage as under QHD (or any present bias). Instead of perceiving no di↵erence in their bargaining
power, the two types act in accordance with a shared understanding that a front-end delay confers an
advantage due to present bias.
Result 5 (Front-End Delay Advantage in Treatment WW1D). In Treatment WW1D, the initial
proposals by delayed weekly bargainers significantly exceed and first-order stochastically dominate those
by weekly bargainers without delay.
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5.2.2 Across Treatments
We now turn to testing the predictions of a basic delay advantage and front-end delay neutrality vs.
advantage across treatments. Here, we generally exploit the feature of our design that we observe the
same bargainer types against di↵erent opponent bargainer types. In contrast to the within-treatment
comparisons, we therefore have to separately consider predictions for the “common type” as the initial
proposer and as the initial respondent. Throughout, we focus on the data from the last 5 matches
for these comparisons. Recall here that the rates of immediate agreement are similar across any two
treatments.
First, we consider the basic delay advantage according to general Prediction (3b), which is common
to both EXD and QHD: fixing the initial role, the weekly bargainer is predicted to obtain a greater
share against a monthly bargainer (in Treatment WM ) than against a delayed weekly bargainer (in
Treatment WW1D). The weekly bargainer (with no delay) is the common type here, and we have to
consider two comparisons, each comparing behavior across the two di↵erent opponent types (treat-
ments): one for the weekly bargainer as the initial proposer and another for the weekly bargainer
as the initial respondent. The two pairs of CDFs of initial proposals—by and to weekly bargainers,
respectively—are shown in Figure 6.
(a) Weekly Proposer in WM v. WW1D (b) Weekly Respondent in WM v. WW1D
Figure 6: Response to Di↵erent Types by Weekly – Last 5 Matches
Figure 6(a) compares Round-1 proposals by weekly bargainers to monthly bargainers, as in Treat-
ment WM (solid), and to delayed weekly bargainers, as in Treatment WW1D (dashed), for the last
5 matches. Consistent with Prediction (3b), the former distribution clearly first-order stochastically
dominates the latter. The di↵erence is highly significant statistically (KS test, p-value < 0.01). This
finding demonstrates that weekly bargainers perceive themselves in a much stronger initial proposing
position against monthly bargainers than delayed weekly ones, in strong confirmation of Prediction
(3b).38
38Notably, this finding contradicts near-future bias; see footnote 28.
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Figure 6(b) compares Round-1 proposals to weekly bargainers by monthly bargainers, as in Treat-
ment WM (solid), and by delayed weekly bargainers, as in Treatment WW1D (dashed), for the last
5 matches. Again, consistent with Prediction (3b), the former distribution quite obviously first-order
stochastically dominates the latter, and this di↵erence is also highly significant statistically (KS test,
p-value < 0.01). What is remarkable here is that much of this di↵erence is due to the fact that approx-
imately 60% of monthly bargainers propose an equal split to a weekly bargainer, whereas only 40%
of delayed weekly bargainers do so. This finding in turn demonstrates that, against the same weekly
bargainer type, the monthly bargainers perceive their initial proposing position to be weaker than the
delayed weekly ones perceive theirs, providing further strong confirmation of Prediction (3b).
Result 6 (Basic Delay Advantage across Treatments WM and WW1D). The initial proposals by
weekly bargainers to monthly bargainers in Treatment WM significantly exceed and first-order stochas-
tically dominate those to delayed weekly bargainers in Treatment WW1D. The initial proposals to
weekly bargainers by delayed weekly bargainers in Treatment WW1D significantly exceed and first-
order stochastically dominate those by monthly bargainers in Treatment WM.
Next, we turn to Prediction (3c) under EXD and its more permissive qualification (3c’) under QHD,
which concerns another instance of basic delay advantage. Here, the common type is the delayed weekly
type, and we compare this type’s outcomes against the delayed monthly type (Treatment WM2D) and
against the weekly type with no delay (TreatmentWW1D). Figure 7 provides the pairwise comparisons.
(a) Del. Weekly Proposer WM2D v. WW1D (b) Del. Weekly Respondent WM2D v. WW1D
Figure 7: Response to Di↵erent Types by Delayed Weekly Bargainers– Last 5 Matches
Figure 7(a) compares Round-1 proposals by delayed weekly bargainers to delayed monthly bar-
gainers, as in Treatment WM2D (solid), and to weekly bargainers (with no delay), as in Treatment
WW1D (dashed). In this case, EXD predicts an unambiguously greater advantage against delayed
monthly bargainers, whereas QHD implies that weekly bargainers with no delay may also be the
weaker respondents if their present bias is su ciently strong to outweigh their delay advantage in later
rounds. The EXD Prediction (3c) is here rejected, since there is neither any qualitative first-order
dominance relationship between the CDFs nor any statistically significant di↵erence between them
29
(KS test, p-value = 0.349). In other words, delayed weekly bargainers perceive their initial proposing
position to be roughly equally strong against both of these opponent types. This is consistent with
Prediction (3c’) under QHD (or a strong present bias).
Figure 7(b) compares Round-1 proposals made to delayed weekly bargainers by delayed monthly
bargainers, as in in Treatment WM2D (solid), and by weekly bargainers (with no delay), as in Treat-
ment WW1D (dashed). Since an initial proposer’s present bias is irrelevant to equilibrium, both EXD
and QHD imply that weekly bargainers should claim more than delayed monthly ones from the same
opponent type, here a delayed weekly bargainer. Our data reject this, however. There is a marginally
significant di↵erence with the opposite first-order stochastic dominance order (KS test, p-value = 0.09).
Delayed monthly bargainers perceive their initial proposing position against delayed weekly ones to
be somewhat stronger than weekly ones do, in contradiction to both Predictions (3c) and (3c’).39
Result 7 (Basic Delay Advantage across Treatments WM2D and WW1D). The initial proposals by
delayed weekly bargainers to delayed monthly bargainers in Treatment WM2D and those to weekly
bargainers (with no delay) in Treatment WW1D are not significantly di↵erent in their distributions,
and we observe no first-order stochastic dominance relationship. The initial proposals to delayed weekly
bargainers by delayed monthly bargainers in Treatment WM2D marginally significantly exceed and first-
order stochastically dominate those by weekly bargainers (with no delay) in Treatment WW1D.
Finally, we turn to Predictions (4b) and (4b’), which concern front-end delay neutrality under EXD
vs. front-end delay advantage under QHD (present bias). We investigate this by comparing Treatments
WM and WM2D, which are strategically identical under EXD but not under QHD because a front-end
delay lowers the initial respondent’s cost of delay, thereby increasing bargaining power. Recalling that
the initial proposer’s present bias is irrelevant, the di↵erential prediction under QHD is that Round-1
proposals by weekly bargainers (delayed or not) should claim a greater share in Treatment WM than
in Treatment WM2D ; a similar prediction is made for the initial proposals by monthly bargainers.
Figure 8(a) compares Round-1 proposals by weekly bargainers to monthly bargainers, as in Treat-
ment WM (solid), and by delayed weekly bargainers to delayed monthly bargainers, as in Treatment
WM2D (dashed). Under EXD, these are predicted to be the same, whereas under QHD, they should be
larger in Treatment WM without front-end delay. The visual comparison suggests first-order stochas-
tic dominance supporting the QHD prediction. However, there are somewhat more very high proposals
(i.e., proposers claiming a very high share for themselves) in Treatment WM2D, and the di↵erence in
distributions is not statistically significant (KS test, p-value = 0.48). EXD’s Prediction (4b) cannot
explain the particular shape of CDFs yet cannot be rejected. Granting that our distributional test
may be somewhat conservative, there is some, limited support for QHD’s alternative Prediction (4b’).
Figure 8(b) compares Round-1 proposals by monthly bargainers to weekly bargainers, as in Treat-
ment WM (solid), and by delayed monthly bargainers to delayed weekly bargainers, as in Treatment
39Near-future bias also leads to Prediction (3c), which is strongly rejected; see footnote 28.
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(a) Weekly Proposers in WM v. WM2D (b) Monthly Proposers in WM v. WM2D
Figure 8: Response to Di↵erent Types by Front-End Delay – Last 5 Matches
WM2D (dashed). In contrast to both Predictions (4b) and (4b’), the latter proposals first-order
stochastically dominate the former, and this di↵erence is highly statistically significant (KS test,
p-value < 0.01). Delayed monthly bargainers claim more from delayed weekly ones than monthly
bargainers do from weekly ones. Predictions (4b) and (4b’) are overall rejected.
Result 8 (Front-End Delay Advantage Across Treatments WM and WM2D). The initial proposals by
weekly bargainers to monthly bargainers in Treatment WM tend to first-order stochastically dominate
those by delayed weekly bargainers to delayed monthly bargainers in Treatment WM2D, but they are not
significantly di↵erent statistically. The initial proposals by delayed monthly bargainers to delayed weekly
bargainers in Treatment WM2D significantly exceed and first-order stochastically dominate those by
weekly bargainers to monthly bargainers in Treatment WM.
5.3 Summary and Discussion
Overall, we obtain rather strong support for the theoretical predictions under QHD (present bias). This
is true above all in our within-treatment comparisons. The two failures—one part of the e↵ective-delay
advantage Prediction (3c’) and one part of the front-end-delay advantage Prediction (4b’)—occur in
the naturally tougher comparisons across treatments. Remarkably, however, both occur with proposals
by the same type in the same treatment: the delayed monthly bargainers in Treatment WM2D claim
“too much” from their opponents, the delayed weekly bargainers; i.e., they perceive their position as
“too strong.” Indeed, if we exclude all comparisons involving Treatment WM2D, thereby focusing on
within-treatment Predictions (3a,WM ) and (4a), as well as across-treatment Prediction (3b), then the
behavioral support for the theory under QHD (present bias) is overwhelming. Our participants here
convincingly demonstrate a shared understanding that a longer basic delay makes a bargainer weaker
(both as the initial respondent and as the initial proposer), and a front-end delay makes a bargainer
stronger (as the initial respondent).
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What might explain then the theoretically surprising findings that, as the initial proposer, de-
layed monthly bargainers exert greater bargaining power against their delayed weekly opponents than
(i) weekly bargainers (with no delay) against the same opponent types and (ii) monthly bargainers
against weekly bargainers (neither with delay)? As pointed out in our discussion of the behavioral
implications of other time preferences, hyperbolic discounting can permissively explain these features
while predicting the same as QHD, and its predictions are strongly confirmed. From this perspective,
we find evidence for present bias together with hyperbolic discounting. Still, QHD arguably captures
the key features of behavior very well while being parametrically parsimonious and tractable.
As expected, we also find evidence for social preferences. Overall, more than 45% of proposals
correspond to an equal split. There are, however, notable di↵erences across treatments and bargainer
types, as can be seen in the within-treatment comparisons. Indeed, the predictions’ confirmations
in terms of first-order stochastic dominance all come with correspondingly sizable di↵erences in the
fraction of proposed equal splits. Relatedly, Treatment WM2D is the only one in which this fraction is
almost identical for both types. The strong confirmation of Prediction (4a) via Treatment WW1D, a
front-end delay advantage, could also be explained by social preferences for equalizing utility, given the
treatment’s asymmetry in terms of the payo↵ timing of immediate agreements. However, the di↵erence
we find concerns the entire distribution and is substantial, which suggests that the contribution of
social preferences is only partial. Confirming this interpretation, in both other treatments immediate
agreements come with no payo↵ delay di↵erence, and we still find a strong e↵ect.
Overall, roughly 3 of 4 proposals are accepted immediately. While this means a great amount of
e ciency, a fair number of proposals are still rejected. It seems clear that information is in fact incom-
plete because preferences are heterogeneous, and this incomplete information causes such rejections.
However, our experimental procedure has arguably proven to be rather successful in establishing a
common understanding of relative bargaining power based on time preferences, as intended. As part
of this procedure, we made the di↵erent individual payo↵ delays within a match very salient. If some
of the predictions’ confirmations appear to be “obvious” consequences of this, in spite of incomplete
information about preferences (time, risk, social), then this is exactly the point to make: when two
bargainers share a common understanding of who is more patient, then their behavior will reflect this
in terms of greater bargaining power.40
6 Concluding Remarks
Our findings confirm that patience is a source of bargaining power. We obtain this confirmation
by contributing a novel between-subjects design that randomly manipulates time preferences at the
individual level. As argued, we consider the behavioral success of the theory in our experiment—
certainly relative to prior related studies—a consequence of how our design controls the inherently
40This is also confirmed by our analysis of learning in Appendix C.
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incomplete preference information that the participants and also we as researchers have. Since this
issue arises importantly in many settings, we interpret this paper’s results also as a demonstration of
our method’s wider usefulness.
This paper speaks to the large body of theoretical analyses of dynamic strategic interaction, where
time preferences—with few exceptions, this means simply “the discount factor”—are a key driver of
behavior. The general observation that time preferences matter in ways predicted by equilibrium, here
established for the classic setting of indefinite alternating-o↵ers bargaining, contributes a very positive
message. It confirms a necessary condition for the empirical validity of basic theoretical exercises.
At the same time, beyond exponential discounting, patience becomes a more complicated notion;
there is no longer simply “a” discount factor, but there are potentially many. We obtain strong
evidence for a present bias, as parsimoniously captured by the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model.
The fact that people seem to share a common understanding of this bias and strategically respond to
it is encouraging and even calls for further theoretical analyses of dynamic strategic interaction with
present-biased individuals.
At a more detailed level, however, we also obtain evidence for present bias as a feature of dimin-
ishing impatience, i.e., hyperbolic discounting. Our design o↵ers a rare opportunity to investigate
the strategic role of time preferences in such detail. While largely unexplored in strategic interaction
(though see Obara and Park, 2017, for a notable exception in the context of repeated games), our
result may also inspire both empirical and theoretical future work in this direction. For instance, we
suspect that diminishing impatience could also contribute towards explaining the frequently observed
U-shaped agreement-time curves in bargaining settings with deadlines (i.e., disproportionately many
agreements right at the beginning and just before the deadline) reported in the literature (e.g., Roth,
Murnighan, and Schoumaker, 1988; Embrey, Fréchette, and Lehrer, 2014; Karagözoğlu and Riedl,
2014; Karagözoğlu, Keskin, and Özcan-Tok, 2019).
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Proof. Define, for each player i, the function fi ∶ [0,1] → [0,1] as fi (U) = 1 − u−1j (U). If player j is
the respondent and could obtain a fixed utility U by rejecting, then 1 − u−1j (U) is the maximal share of
proposer i that j is willing to accept. Equation (3.1) then says that xn = frn+1 ( rn (n) ⋅ urn (xn+1)), whereby
any sequence xn corresponds to a history-independent equilibrium: in any round n, the proposing player
o↵ers share 1 − xn, thus keeping xn for herself, and this is the smallest o↵er accepted by the responding
player, who upon rejection would similarly capture xn+1. (Note the indi↵erence of the responding player,
urn (1 − xn) =  rn (n) ⋅ urn (xn+1).)
Take now any odd-numbered round N in which player 1 is the proposer, and consider the two extreme
cases for responding player 2’s continuation utility upon rejection: first, when it is minimal and equals zero,
and second, when it is maximal and equals one. For each of these two cases, compute the implied backwards
induction solution for the thus truncated game. Clearly, it has immediate agreement in every round, and
starting from the respective extreme terminal values, it is characterized by the recursive equation (3.1) for
all rounds up through round N . (The extreme shares xN+1 = 0 and xN+1 = 1 correspond to the extreme
continuation utilities U2 = 0 and U2 = 1.) Define these two finite sequences as aNn and bNn , and—using
assumption 3 with ↵ ≡max{↵1,↵2}—observe that
￿aNN − bNN ￿ = aNN − bNN
= f1 (0) − f1 ( 2 (N))
= u−12 ( 2 (N)) − u−12 (0)
≤ ↵ ⋅  2 (N)
￿aNN−1 − bNN−1￿ = bNN−1 − aNN−1
= f2 ( 1 (N − 1) ⋅ u1 (f1 ( 2 (N)))) − f2 ( 1 (N − 1) ⋅ u1 (f1 (0)))
= u−11 ( 1 (N − 1) ⋅ u1 (f1 (0))) − u−11 ( 1 (N − 1) ⋅ u1 (f1 ( 2 (N))))
≤ ↵ ⋅ (f1 (0) − f1 ( 2 (N)))
≤ ↵2 ⋅  2 (N)
⋮





￿ →n→∞ 0 (recall that we use only odd-numbered rounds), and hence limn→∞ a2n−11 =
limn→∞ b2n−11 , which proves the claim, since a2n−11 ≥ x1 ≥ b2n−11 for all n.
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Proposition 1
Proof. Consider any odd-numbered round N in which player 1 is the proposer, and suppose the supremal
equilibrium continuation utility of player 2 takes the highest possible value of 1. Then there exists an equi-
librium with the outcome that players agree in round 1 and proposing player 1 obtains share aN
1
, defined in
the proof of Lemma 1. Similarly, supposing the infimal equilibrium continuation utility of player 2 takes the
lowest possible value of 0, there exists an equilibrium with the outcome that players agree in round 1 and
proposing player 1 obtains share bN
1
, defined in the proof of Lemma 1. Now, any equilibrium utility value
U1 of player 1 (as of round 1) satisfies u1 (a1)N ≥ U1 ≥ u1 ￿bN1 ￿, whereby Lemma 1 proves its uniqueness. A
similar argument proves the uniqueness of player 2’s equilibrium utility. Both are uniquely obtained in the
immediate-agreement equilibrium characterized by the sequence of Lemma 1.
Prediction 1
Proof. Immediate agreement (1) is a general implication, irrespective of how players discount utility. The
other predictions require proof. In preparation, note that defining f(U) ≡ 1 − u−1 (U) for any U ∈ [0,1],
Proposition 1 implies that the unique equilibrium is characterized by
xE1 = f ￿ 2 u ￿f ￿ 1 u ￿xE1 ￿￿￿￿ and xE2 = f ￿ 1 u ￿xE1 ￿￿ , (A.1)
where xEi is the share that individual i obtains in immediate agreement whenever she gets to propose. This
share xEi obtains as the unique (and interior) fixed point of the function gi (q) ≡ f ( j u (f ( i u (q)))),
defined for any q ∈ [0,1].41 The characterization covers all matches of all treatments.
For the Proposer Advantage (2), simply observe that xEi > u−1 ￿ i u ￿xEi ￿￿ = 1 − f ￿ i u ￿xEi ￿￿ = 1 − xEj .





(comparison of proposer shares), which is equivalent to 1 − xE
2
> 1 − xE
1
(comparison of
respondent shares). Given A.1, this covers all parts.
Finally, (4) follows directly from the irrelevance of front-end delay under exponential discounting, as
explained earlier.
Prediction 2
Proof. Again, (1) requires no specific proof. For the remainder, note that the second-round continuation
equilibrium is characterized by the shares xEi solving the two equations (A.1). Backwards induction then
yields immediate agreement in the first round, with the initial proposer’s share given by
xQ
1
= f ￿ 2 2 u ￿xE2 ￿￿ .
41Our preference assumptions imply that each gi is continuous and increasing from gi (0) > 0 through gi (1) < 1,
whereby a fixed point exists and any fixed point is interior. Moreover, by our third preference assumption, each gi has
a slope less than one, so there is a unique fixed point.
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(2) follows straight from the corresponding proof for EXD upon noting that  2 ≤ 1 implies xQ1 ≥ xE1 , since
xE
1
> 1 − xE
2
= u−1 ￿ 1 u ￿xE1 ￿￿ ≥ u−1 ￿ 1 1 u ￿xE1 ￿￿.
For (3a), first observe that WM has  1 =  2 =   and that the respondent’s continuation share is smaller for
the monthly than the weekly bargainer from EXD. Hence, the initial proposer’s share xQ
1
is greater (equiva-
lently, the initial respondent’s share 1−xQ
1
is smaller) when the weekly bargainer initially proposes against the
monthly bargainer than when the monthly bargainer initially proposes against the weekly bargainer. Second,
observe that WM2D has  1 =  2 = 1, whereby predictions are as under EXD.
For (3b), observe that the weekly bargainer’s continuation share is greater against the monthly bargainer
(WM ) than against the delayed weekly bargainer (WW1D), both as the initial proposer and as the initial
respondent, from EXD. Hence, when the weekly bargainer is the initial respondent, ( 2, 2) = (1, ), 1−xQ1 is
greater against the monthly bargainer, ( 1, 1) = ( , ), than against the delayed weekly bargainer, ( 1, 1) =(1,1). When the weekly bargainer is the initial proposer, a responding delayed weekly bargainer is una↵ected
by present bias, whereas a responding monthly bargainer is additionally weakened by it; this implication
follows also for the cross-treatment comparison of the weekly bargainer’s shares as the initial proposer.
For (3c’), first observe that with the initial respondent’s type equal to ( 2, 2) = (1,1), her continuation
share—hence also 1 − xQ
1
—is smaller against the weekly than the monthly bargainer, as under EXD. Second,
fixing ( 1, 1) = (1,1), it should be clear from continuity that a violation of the prediction under EXD—
meaning xQ
1
is smaller when ( 2, 2) = ( ,1) than when ( 2, 2) = (1, )—is obtained as   approaches one
while   approaches zero.
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Figure 9: The Proportions of Agreements over Rounds – First 5 Matches
Figure 10: The Proportions of Immediate Agreements – All Matches
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Proposer Advantage: First 5 Matches’ Proposals and Accepted Proposals
Figure 11: Proposer Advantage – First 5 Matches’ Proposals
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Proposer Advantage: Final Payo↵s incl. Random Termination
Figure 12: Final Payo↵s (All) – First and Last 5 Matches
Proposer Advantage: Final Payo↵s excl. Random Termination
Figure 13: Final Payo↵s (excl. Random Terminations) – First and Last 5 Matches
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Basic Delay and Front-End Delay Advantages: Proposals over Matches
Figure 14: Round-1 Proposals over Matches in Treatment WM
Figure 15: Round-1 Proposals over Matches in Treatment WM2D
Figure 16: Round-1 Proposals over Matches in Treatment WW1D
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Basic Delay and Front-End Delay Advantages: Accepted Proposals
(a) First 5 Matches (b) Last 5 Matches
Figure 17: Accepted Proposals in Treatment WM – First and Last 5 Matches
(a) First 5 Matches (b) Last 5 Matches
Figure 18: Accepted Proposals in Treatment WM2D – First and Last 5 Matches
(a) First 5 Matches (b) Last 5 Matches
Figure 19: Accepted Proposals in Treatment WW1D – First and Last 5 Matches
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C Learning
We explore here whether and how a proposer’s behavior is a↵ected by the bargaining outcome in the previous
match. Table 2 reports the regression results in which the dependent variable is the proposer’s proposed (own)
share in Round 1 of each match (excluding the very first one, which has no history).
Table 2: Learning
Accepted proposals All proposals in Round 1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Match 2-5 Match 6-10 Match 2-5 Match 6-10
Match -2.753** -1.500** -2.960** -1.443*
(1.111) (0.690) (1.055) (0.695)
Accepted Share 0.221** 0.393**
(0.101) (0.140)
Accepted Round 3.904 5.959**
(2.460) (2.198)
Round 1 Share 0.010 0.042
(0.036) (0.056)
Round 1 Accept -41.723** -104.134**
(16.823) (36.187)
Round 1 Accept × Round 1 Share 0.160* 0.338**
(0.080) (0.126)
Constant 215.125*** 169.088*** 275.465*** 283.736***
(27.188) (32.635) (5.721) (7.227)
R-squared 0.043 0.102 0.027 0.074
Observations 615 796 696 870
Notes: OLS regression with the proposer’s proposed (own) share in Round 1 as the dependent variable. The
independent variable “Accepted Share” is one’s own share that was accepted in Round 1 of the previous match.
“Accepted Round” represents the number of the round in which the proposal was accepted in the previous match.
“Round 1 Share” is one’s own share that was proposed in Round 1 of the previous match. “Round 1 Accept”
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if and only if the proposal was accepted in Round 1 of the previous







Overall, our participants were more likely to o↵er higher shares to respondents as they gained experience.
In columns (1) and (2), we restrict our attention to proposals that were accepted in the previous match. A
higher share in the previous match meant that a participant became more likely to claim a higher share as
the proposer in Round 1 of the subsequent match. The magnitude of this association became stronger in the
later part of the experiment. An agreement reached only in later rounds also made the proposals in Round 1
more aggressive, but this was significant only in the later matches.
We also look at all proposals in the previous match in columns (3) and (4), with a particular focus on
whether proposals were accepted in Round 1. The fact that a proposal was rejected in Round 1 of the previous
match led proposers to make less aggressive proposals in the subsequent match. Interestingly, the tendency of
higher shares in the previous match to lead to more aggressive proposals was significantly stronger for accepted
proposals than for rejected proposals. In summary, participants’ learning from their past experiences made
them behave more consistently with the theoretical predictions.
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D Experimental Instructions - Treatment WM
Welcome to the experiment. Please read these instructions carefully; the payment you will receive from this
experiment depends on the decisions you make. The amount you earn will be paid through VENMO.
Your Payment Type and Match
At the beginning of the experiment, one-half of the participants will be randomly assigned to be Payment
Type A and the other half to be Payment Type B. Your payment type will remain fixed throughout the
experiment. Your payment type will a↵ect when you will be paid, which will be explained below.
The experiment consists of 10 matches. At the beginning of each match, one Type A participant and one
Type B participant are randomly paired. The pair is fixed within the match. After each match, participants
will be randomly repaired, and new pairs will be formed. You will not learn the identity of the participant
you are paired with, nor will that participant learn your identity—even after the end of the experiment.
Your Decisions in Each Match
Round 1: At the beginning of Round 1, one participant will be randomly assigned to the role of a proposer
and the other participant to the role of a responder. Each participant in a match has 50-50 chance to be
the proposer and to be the responder regardless of his/her payment type.
The proposer is then asked to propose how to split 500 tokens (= $50) between the two participants as:
“ tokens for yourself and tokens for the other person.”
After observing the split proposed by the proposer, the responder decides whether to accept or reject the
proposed split.
Outcome, Termination, and Transition to Next Round: The outcome of Round 1 depends on whether
the split proposed by the proposer is accepted or rejected.
1. If the responder accepts the proposed split, both participants will receive the amounts of tokens as
proposed, and the match will be terminated.
2. If the responder rejects the proposed split, then the match will proceed to the next round with 75%
(3/4) chance or be terminated with 25% (1/4) chance. This is as if we were to roll a 100-sided die and
continue if the selected number is less than or equal to 75 and end if the number chosen is larger than
75.
(a) If a match is terminated after a rejection of a proposed split, both participants will receive 0
tokens for the match.
(b) If the match proceeds to the next round, then the proposer-responder roles are alternated. That
is, the participant who is the proposer in the current round will become the responder in the next
round, and vice versa. The number of tokens the participants receive will be determined by the
outcome of the subsequent rounds.
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Round K > 1: In Round K > 1, the participant who was the proposer in Round (K − 1) becomes the
responder, and the participant who was the responder in Round (K −1) becomes the proposer. The proposer
is then asked to propose how to split 500 tokens (= $50) between the two participants. After observing the
split proposed by the proposer, the responder decides whether to accept or reject the proposed split.
The rest of the procedures determining the outcome, termination of the round, and transition to next
round, is the same as those in Round 1.
Information Feedback
• At the end of each round, you will be informed about the proposal made by the proposer and the
accept/reject decision made by the responder.
• At the end of each match, you will be informed when and how much you are going to be paid.
Your Monetary Payments
At the end of the experiment, one match out of 10 will be randomly selected for your payment. Every
match has an equal chance to be selected for your payment so that it is in your best interest to take each
match seriously. Participants will receive the amounts of tokens according to the outcome from the selected
match with the exchange rate of 1 token = $0.1.
When you are going to be paid depends on (1) your payment type and (2) the round in which the
proposed split is accepted.
If you are Type A, you may be paid today or in a few weeks. If a proposed split is accepted in Round
1, you will be paid today right after the experiment. If a proposed split is accepted in Round 2, you will be
paid in one week. If a proposed split is accepted in Round K > 1, you will be paid in (K − 1) weeks.
If you are Type B, you may be paid today or in a few months. If a proposed split is accepted in Round
1, you will be today right after the experiment. If a proposed split is accepted in Round 2, you will be paid
in one month. If a proposed split is accepted in Round K > 1, you will be paid in (K − 1) months.
The following table summarizes the schedule of payment for each type:
If a proposed split is accepted in Type A will be paid Type B will be paid
Round 1 Today Today
Round 2 In 1 week In 1 month
Round 3 In 2 weeks In 2 months
Round 4 In 3 weeks In 3 months
Round 5 In 4 weeks In 4 months
⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
Round K In (K − 1) weeks In (K − 1) months
Any amount you are supposed to receive will be paid electronically via VENMO.
In addition to your earnings from the selected match, you will receive a show-up fee of $10 through
VENMO, right after the experiment.
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A Practice Match
To ensure your comprehension of the instructions, you will participate in a practice match. The practice
match is part of the instructions and is not relevant to your cash payment; its objective is to get you familiar
with the computer interface and the flow of the decisions in each round of a match. Once the practice match
is over, the computer will tell you “The o cial matches begin now!”
Rundown of the Study
1. At the beginning of the experiment, your payment type will be randomly determined. Your payment
type will remain fixed throughout the experiment.
2. At the beginning of each match, one Type A participant and one Type B participant are randomly
paired.
3. At the beginning of Round 1, one participant will be randomly assigned to the role of a proposer and
the other to the role of a responder.
4. The proposer then proposes how to split 500 tokens (= $50).
5. If the responder accepts the proposed split, both participants will receive the amounts of tokens as
proposed, and the match will be terminated.
6. If the responder rejects the proposed split, then the match will proceed to the next round with 75%
(3/4) chance or be terminated with 25% (1/4) chance. If a match is terminated after the rejection of a
proposed split, both participants will receive 0 tokens for the match.
7. If the match proceeds to the next round, then the proposer-responder roles are alternated.
8. At the end of the experiment, one of 10 matches will be randomly selected for payment. For the selected
match, the timing of your payment depends on (1) your payment type and (2) the round in which the
proposed split was accepted. All your earnings will be paid to you through VENMO.
9. For Type A, you may be paid today or in a few weeks. For Type B, you may be paid today or in a few
months.
10. In addition to your earnings from the selected match, you will receive a show-up fee of $10 right after
the experiment.
Administration
Your decisions, as well as your monetary payment, will be kept confidential. Remember that you have to
make your decisions entirely on your own; please do not discuss your decisions with any other participants.
Upon finishing the experiment, you will be asked to sign your name to acknowledge your receipt of the
payment. You are then free to leave. If you have any question, please raise your hand now. We will answer
your question individually.
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E Selected z-Tree Screen-shots
Figure 20: Proposer ’s Screen
Figure 21: Responder ’s Screen
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F Elicited Time Preferences and Behavior
We also elicited conventional measures of time preferences from our participants. This served two purposes:
First, we can thereby test whether the random assignment to treatment and also bargainer type was indeed
successful with regards to the underlying time preferences, and second, we can also relate those conventional
measures to behavior, as a complement to our main analysis.
Elicitation Procedure. We administered our elicitation task in only 4 out of the 6 sessions in each
treatment (228 out of 348 participants), where it followed the bargaining games. Participants were not
informed about this elicitation task beforehand, and they received all payo↵-relevant information from their
choices only at the very end of the experiment. The elicitation task asked participants to make 8 blocks of
binary decisions between a sooner payment (option A) and a later payment (option B). In each block, one of
the two was a fixed amount (either $4 or $10), and the other amount increased from $0.01 in minimal steps
of $0.01 to $10.00, resulting in e↵ectively 1,000 binary decisions (rows) per block. Participants were asked for
their switching point in terms of the varying option’s amount, which they had to enter. The computer would
automatically select the fixed option in all rows with a smaller varying amount and the varying option in all
rows with a larger such amount. One row would be selected at random and the decision implemented, for
one randomly drawn block. In essence, this is a version of the BDM (Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak, 1964)
method, hence incentive compatible, but explained via a price list. The full instructions and a screenshot are
available at the end of this section.
Table 3: Description of the Elicitation Task
Switching Sooner ⇒ Later
Block (1) (2) (3) (4)
Sooner
$4 $4 $4 $4
Today Today 1 month 1 month
Later
$X $X $X $X
1 week 1 month 1 month and 1 week 2 months
Switching Sooner ⇐ Later
Block (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sooner
$X $X $X $X
Today Today 1 month 1 month
Later
$10 $10 $10 $10
1 week 1 month 1 month and 1 week 2 months
*Note: X denotes the amounts that vary from 0.01 to 10.
Table 3 provides an overview of the details of the task. The block numbers correspond to their order in
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the task. There were four di↵erent sooner and later payment combinations: (1) sooner payment today and
later payment in 1 week, (2) sooner payment today and later payment in 1 month, (3) sooner payment in 1
month and later payment in 1 month plus 1 week, and (4) sooner payment in 1 month and later payment in
2 months. For the first 4 blocks, the sooner payment was fixed at $4.00 while the later payment ranged from
$0.01 to $10.00. For the last 4 blocks, the later payment was fixed at $10.00, and the sooner payment ranged
from $0.01 to $10.00.
Distributions of Switching Points. We first compare the distributions of switching points Xk, where
k ∈ {1,2, . . . ,8} refers to the block number, by treatment and bargainer type, to check whether our randomiza-
tion in terms of underlying time preferences was successful. Figure 22 provides the corresponding box plots.
We use the same test as for our bargaining predictions, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, to compare the switch-
ing point distributions on all 8 blocks. Since we test bargaining predictions both concerning comparisons
between the two bargainer types within any treatment and between treatments for a given bargainer type,
we carry out analogous tests on the time preference task responses. Comparing, first, the switching points
between the two bargainer types within any treatment—e.g., weekly vs. montly in treatment WM—we find
no significant di↵erences (8 binary comparisons per treatment times 3 treatments, hence 24 binary compar-
isons, all p-values greater than 0.239). Second, and given this finding, we compare responses between various
pairs of treatments—e.g., WM vs. WM2D—with a similar result (8 binary comparisons per treatment pair-
ing times 3 treatment pairings, hence 24 binary comparisons, all p-values greater than 0.226).42 Overall, we
therefore conclude that our randomization into treatments and types in terms of underlying time preferences
was successful indeed.
(a) Blocks 1-4 (b) Blocks 5-8
Figure 22: Distribution of Switching Points by Type/Treatment/Block
42We run the same test for weekly types only, where there are three treatment comparisons (there are weekly types
in all treatments) and for monthly types only, where there is one treatment comparion (WM vs. WM2D). This results
in (3+ 1) ⋅ 8 = 32 binary comparisons, and all except three of them have p-values greater than 0.375. The smallest three
equal 0.117, 0.123 and 0.167, so may be considered borderline. However, all of them concern comparisons of weekly
types for trade-o↵s with a month’s delay, namely X4 and X8, which are not the relevant ones for their bargaining.
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Relation to Bargaining Behavior. We next relate our elicitation to bargaining behavior. The elicita-
tion task is designed to infer parameters of ( ,  )-discounting, under the assumption that the participants are
approximately risk neutral together with the standard narrow bracketing assumption (recall here the small
stakes of at most $10). We first estimate these for every participant, using the switching points for indi↵erence
equations—e.g., 4 =   X1 and 4 =  X3, or X5 =   10 and X7 =  10; details below—and then relate proposer
as well as respondent behavior to the parameter estimates using regressions.
To estimate the two parameters we use for each participant the responses to the blocks that correspond to
their type in bargaining; i.e., for a weekly type we considerX1, X3, X5, andX7, which involve a delay of a week,
and for a monthly type we consider the other four, which involve a delay of a month (in both cases irrespective
of whether their type has front-end delay). We then exclude participants whose responses on their relevant
subset are inconsistent or do not allow us to infer indi↵erence.43 For the remaining participants, we compute
( ,  ) once from the two relevant sooner-to-later switching points among the first four blocks and again from
the two relevant later-to-sooner switching point among the last four blocks, and we then take the average of
the two for each parameter to reduce measurement error. For instance, for a weekly type, we compute  w
as the average of  w(1) = 4￿X3 and  w(2) = X7￿10, and then  w as the average of  w(1) = 4￿ w(1)X1 = X3￿X1
and  w(2) = X5￿ w(2)10 = X5￿X7; similarly, for a monthly type, where we denote estimates by ( m,  m). The
results are summarized in Table 4 in terms of averages with standard deviations, and in Figure 23 in terms
of box-plots, by types and treatments.
Table 4: Average Elicited Time Preferences by Type
Treatments
WM WM2D WW1D
Weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly Delay Weekly
 w 1.08 n.a. 0.97 n.a. 0.99 1.02
(0.42) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
 w 0.85 n.a. 0.88 n.a. 0.88 0.86
(0.19) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
 m n.a. 1.00 n.a. 0.99 n.a. n.a.
(0.13) (0.15)
 m n.a. 0.85 n.a. 0.90 n.a. n.a.
(0.17) (0.13)
Obs. 26 25 26 18 27 28
# excluded 11 12 13 21 11 10
*Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 4 shows that around a third of participants per type and treatment had to be excluded, with the
exception of monthly bargainers in TreatmentWM2D, where this was one half. The average   is very similar in
43Inconsistency refers to assumed impatience and transitivity. It means here (i) Xk < 4, or (ii) Xk = 10 and Xk+4 > 4,
for at least one of the two relevant k ∈ {1,2,3,4}; moreover, while Xk = 10 together with Xk+4 < 4 is not inconsistent, it
does not allow to establish indi↵erence because a highly impatient person may strictly prefer the fixed sooner amount
of $4 in block k over the maximal possible switching point of $10.
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all six cases, ranging from 0.97 to 1.08, which supports the quasi-hyperbolic structure. Moreover, the standard
deviations are of similar sizes, except for weekly types in Treatment WM, where there are two outliers. Also
the average   is very similar in all six cases, ranging from 0.85 to 0.90, and all standard deviations are of
similar size. There is no tendency for  m to be smaller than  w, however, even though it is based on a month’s
delay as opposed to a week’s delay.
(a)   (excl. one outlier in Weekly WM ) (b)  
Figure 23: Distribution of   and   by Type/Treatment
Figure 23 presents the underlying distributional information as box-plots, also including outside values.
(One weekly type in Treatment WM has a far outlying  w close to 3, which is not shown.) The median values
of   are all equal to one, and most of the mass lies around one in all cases, so the distributions are rather
similar. The median values of   are equal to 0.90 in all cases except for the monthly types of Treatment
WM2D for whom the median equals 0.97, and the distributions are quite similar too (again, regardless of
whether the delay is a week or a month).
We now use our estimates as regressors in two specifications, one regarding proposer behavior and another
regarding respondent behavior. Table 5 presents the results of OLS regressions of Round-1 proposals of various
types in the treatments on the proposer’s time preference parameters (and a constant). The explanatory
power of these parameters is extremely weak, only in two cases is there a weakly statistically significant
(partial) correlation with the proposals made (once positive for   in specification 3, and once positive for   in
specification 5), and there is no discernible pattern in terms of coe cient signs. When pooling all observations
(specification 7), we observe what may be the expected positive signs for both parameters, though the co-
e cient on   is estimated very close to zero and far from being significantly di↵erent, and the co-e cient on
  is barely significant (at the 10%-level); the explanatory power is once again extremely weak.44
44If we only include observations where the proposer demands strictly more than half the cake (> 250) in the pooled
specification (352 observations), then both positive co-e cients become greater in size, that on   turns significant at
the 10%-level, and that on   turns significant at the 1%-level. However, they still explain very little of the variation
in proposals. Moreover, in the separate regressions per type/treatment, the results remain very similar also under that
sample restriction.
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Table 5:  ,  , and Round-1 Proposer behavior (OLS)
WM WM2D WW1D ALL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly Delay Weekly
  26.15 -17.36 61.57* -14.03 -11.89 -29.16 5.95
(18.44) (29.11) (23.66) (13.85) (18.88) (13.65) (5.60)
  82.61 -18.08 -28.06 0.98 33.87* 28.31 18.67*
(52.43) (23.29) (17.77) (25.00) (12.50) (28.51) (9.08)
Constant 170.7* 286.3*** 231.2*** 281.2*** 245.1*** 265.2*** 240.9***
(66.37) (38.90) (10.99) (22.19) (24.86) (24.09) (11.78)
R2 0.070 0.008 0.076 0.006 0.029 0.032 0.006
Obs. 132 121 132 76 123 155 739
Notes: Dependent variable: Proposer’s Round-1 share. Clustered standard errors at the
session level in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1%-level.
**Significant at the 5%-level.
*Significant at the 10%-level.
Table 6 presents the results of Probit regressions of Round-1 respondent behavior (acceptance=1, re-
jection=0) of various types in the treatments on the share o↵ered together with the two time preference
parameters (and a constant). The results mirror those for proposer behavior: The time preference measures
are also hardly related to respondent behavior.
Table 6:  ,  , and Round-1 Respondent behavior (Probit)
WM WM2D WW1D ALL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weekly Monthly Weekly Monthly Delay Weekly
Own share 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.027** 0.042*** 0.067*** 0.050*** 0.041***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
  -0.656 1.725 -0.524 -0.095 -2.335** -0.286 -0.054
(0.607) (3.711) (1.765) (0.565) (1.017) (2.464) (0.221)
  -2.531 -3.445*** 0.696 -0.801 -0.281 2.419* -0.643
(1.841) (1.266) (1.534) (1.927) (1.648) (1.434) (0.685)
Constant -9.235*** -9.000** -5.915 -8.180* -12.72*** -13.14*** -8.395***
(2.587) (4.105) (4.289) (4.431) (2.722) (3.403) (1.443)
Pseudo-R2 0.316 0.477 0.174 0.322 0.374 0.326 0.229
Obs. 128 129 128 104 147 125 761
Notes: Dependent variable: Respondent’s Round-1 acceptance=1, rejection=0. Clustered stan-
dard errors at the session level in parentheses.
***Significant at the 1%-level.
**Significant at the 5%-level.
*Significant at the 10%-level.
Overall, even within a given treatment for a given bargainer type, conventional time preference measures
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hardly explain behavior. Potential reasons include behaviorally relevant confounds (social preferences and risk
attitudes, belief formation about the opponent) or also a relatively low signal-to-noise ratio of such measures.
As such, the findings lend further support to our study’s design and analysis.
Instructions for Elicitation Task and Selected z-Tree Screen-shot.
Instructions
In this task, we will ask you to make decisions for 8 blocks of questions. In each block, there are 1,000
questions. For each question, you can choose one of two options - Option A, which pays you sooner, and
Option B, which pays you later.
After you answer all questions, one question will be randomly selected and the option you chose on that
question will determine your earnings. Each question is equally likely to be chosen for payment. Obviously,
you have no reason to misreport your preferred choice for any question, because if that question gets chosen
for payment, then you would end up with the option you like less.
For example, the questions in one block are as follows. Note that each row corresponds to a question so
that you have to choose one option for each row.
Questions Option A Today Option B in 1 month
1 $4.00 $0.01
2 $4.00 $0.02
3 $4.00 $0.03⋮ ⋮ ⋮
999 $4.00 $9.99
1,000 $4.00 $10.00
It is natural to expect that you will choose Option A for at least the first few questions, but at some point
switch to choosing Option B. In order to save time, you can report at which dollar value of Option B you’d
switch. The computer program can then ‘fill out’ your answers to all 1,000 questions based on your reported
switching point (choosing Option A for all questions before your switching point, and Option B for all questions
at and after your switching point).
Timing of payment: The 8 blocks will di↵er in the following two ways: (1) the timings of sooner and later
payments:
- Between payment today and payment in 1 week.
- Between payment today and payment in 1 month.
- Between payment in 1 month and payment in 1 month and 1 week.
- Between payment in 1 month and payment in 2 months.
and (2) whether you are asked to switch from Option A to Option B, or from Option B to Option A.
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Payment: At the end of the experiment, one question in one of the blocks will be randomly selected for
payment. The selected question and the block as well as your choice for the question will be displayed on
your screen. Then the payment will be made on the designated date through VENMO. For example, 1. If
your choice in the randomly selected question was to receive a payment today, then you will be paid through
VENMO right after the experiment. 2. If your choice in the randomly selected question was to receive a
payment in the future, you will be paid on the designated date through VENMO.
Rundown of the Study
1. There are 8 blocks of questions, each of which you will be asked to report your switching point.
2. Only one question in one of the eight blocks will be randomly selected for payment.
3. You will be paid on the designated date through VENMO.
Figure 24: Elicitation Task Screen-shot Block 1
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